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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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JAMES COLLINS

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BOOK REVIEW

BOOK NOTICES

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THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
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PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1945

The purpose of this survey is to inform readers of THE MODERN CHOOLMAN about present-day trends in American philosophical inking and to evaluate some of these trends with the aid of a critical it open and growing perennial philosophy. Our best sources for nderstanding the immediate interests of philosophers are not so much e few long-planned books that appear during a year as the numerous id recently conceived articles printed in the philosophical journals. nlike their European and Latin American confreres, American pub-shers have remained unwilling to sponsor a wide variety of inexpensive ntemporary books on philosophy. Not even the university presses the United States can boast of philosophical titles in such number id quality as Alcan or Losada would sponsor during a normal year. ut we are fortunate in the hospitality and diversified interests of our ilosophical reviews, which welcome articles from all standpoints and sually assure publication in reasonable time. It is necessary to turn these channels for a study of the contemporary situation.

I. THE NIETZSCHE CENTENARY

The hundredth anniversary of Nietzsche's birth (1844) occurred hile the United States was still at war with Germany, but it did t go uncommemorated in this country. Although Nietzsche has not ade the same rapid headway here as in his own country and France, s intrinsic importance and potential influence have been gradually cognized during the present century in America as well. Despite e fervid literary cult practiced by Foster and Mencken and the cultural arnings issued by Josiah Royce at the outbreak of the first World ar, the reputation of the "philosopher with a hammer" grew among inkers during the interwar period. Popular attention was focused on him again during the thirties by publicists who attributed the rise

of Nazism to an acceptance of Nietzschean doctrines. The Harvar historian, Crane Brinton, thought it worth while to examine this charg at length in a work which was issued in 1941.[1] The only conclusio reached in this study was that Nietzsche has texts which would bot convict and relieve him of responsibility for the crimes of the Thir Reich. Presumably, Brinton would classify G. A. Morgan's stimulatin exposition of *What Nietzsche Means*[2] along with the productions of th "gentle" rather than the "tough" Nietzscheans. This distinction is however, just as questionable as that of the two Germanies and jus as difficult to apply in particular cases.

Political preoccupations were kept subordinate at a centenary sym posium on Nietzsche's philosophy conducted in New York under th auspices of the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences. For all Nietzsche's dialectical agility and deliberate ambiguity, he helpe to prepare a definite atmosphere of thought about blond beasts, hard ness, and dangerous living; he helped furnish the facile contrasts o master-slave and leader-herd, and the self-justified actions beyond goo and evil. He himself would doubtless be repelled by the clums ineptness with which these notions were translated into action; fo he had preached a secondary kind of sterness which was aimed first a overcoming the weakness of self and the decadence of an age as reflecte in one's thinking. There was nothing of the poised dancer or *l'uom universale* in the average Nazi leader. But, on the other hand, eve Nietzsche's midday hero cannot clarify in more than a verbal way th meaning of human integrity and wholesomeness.

This latter point seems to be the issue between Huszar and Morris Along with his historical exposition, Huszar positively advocate Nietzsche's transvaluation of values as the only true method for over coming the disintegration and pessimism of the nineteenth century an our own day. In significant contrast to thinkers who have fled fo consolation to various religions—metaphysical and emotional feathe pillows—is placed the superman, who alone is self-reliant and healthy But a most pertinent objection is raised by Charles Morris, whose wor with Carnap at Chicago in correlating pragmatism and logical empiricis is well known. He points out that the absolute antithesis erected betwee

[1] *Nietzsche* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1941).

[2] Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1941.

[3] The papers were printed in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. VI, No. (1945): G. de Huszar, "Nietzsche's Theory of Decadence and the Trans valuation of All Values"; K. Löwith, "Nietzsche's Doctrine of Eternal Recur rence"; C. Morris, "Nietzsche, an Evaluation"; discussions by K. Riezle J. Gutmann, and W. Eckstein; P. Tillich, "Nietzsche and the Bourgeois Spirit" W. Eckstein, "Friedrich Nietzsche in the Judgment of Posterity."

ionysus and Christ is both an artificial and an unfair one. By its eans, Nietzsche only set up a new standard of good and evil which ould assign everything contemptible and cowardly under a Christian ading.

The simplified opposition between the creative Dionysian and the cadent Christian concepts of man breaks down when we turn either to eative men or to philosophical analysis. What is assumed throughout the rectitude *and* the completely anti-Christian nature of the ietzschean ideal of man. In actual history it is impossible to sort it the elements of humdrum failure and heroic conquest, of mediocrity nd conformism, of genius and anonymity, according to a mechanical rmula which discovers a hero and a villain of a definite known hue every man's breast. Nietzsche's admitted psychological subtlety unders here before the need to advance his own campaign. At such nes, he provides an exact instance of that fallaciously honorific use terms against which John Dewey has so long been inveighing. These ctics increase persuasive power in inverse ratio to philosophical clarity, nce they are effective only so long as they conceal a basic obscurity nd not merely a masked ambiguity) of thought.

Doctrines like eternal recurrence and transvalued power being no nger capable of verification in nineteenth-century physics and biology, e are inclined to look more intently at their metaphysical sense and alectical verification in the pages of Nietzsche. But the reader of such sympathetic study as Morgan's book is left dissatisfied at the most ucial steps in the argument. Nietzsche continually ignores his own stinction between a genetic account of theism and a philosophical aluation of belief in God. He banishes the Absolute of the "pseudo-ilosophers" only to bring in his own set of idols, writ large in capital tters. This involves his entire theory of values and his conception of e superman's place in the universe. The will to power is justified an enhancement of life, as an increase in utility. Since there are ades of life and various useful manifestations of will, some criterion required to clarify what is meant by higher forms of life. It does tle good to reply that increased vitality is achieved by a more tegrated (Apollonian?) organization of an ever greater number of ntrasting elements, since nothing has been said about the principle integration or the very notion of integrity.[4] We must already agree Nietzsche's conception of the *vita heroica*, for otherwise the contrast tween Christ and Dionysus would itself be the unifying principle, d Nietzsche would no longer be merely a forerunner. G. W. Cunning-

[4] See the study by J. Gutmann, "Integrity as a Standard of Valuation," *Journal Philosophy*, Vol. XLII, No. 8 (1945).

ham[5] suggests that a most instructive lesson can be gathered from Nietzsche's hesitancy about the issues facing the true philosopher. Is he a man torn between only the two extremes of intellectualist absolutism and anti-intellectualist absolutism? Or can he not find a place for "the impulse of knowledge" within a developing functional framework? From a different standpoint, Morris raises the same question. He holds that we should choose only the biological orientation of Nietzsche's thought and should attempt to incorporate Nietzsche's comprehensive person as one among the several types desirable in a pluralistic society. Such a liberal suggestion overlooks the fact that we are here faced with a hierarchical theory which defines one stage of plastic human development by a necessary contrast with other phases. Superman cannot gambol about with complete abandon and exultation unless there are lower breeds to watch, to support — and to be trampled upon.

Both in the symposium under consideration and even more trenchantly in a previous article,[6] the eminent Nietzschean scholar Karl Löwith shows that not even the new Zarathustra can be a pagan in the pre-Christian way. Eternal recurrence must today be passionately willed with an ascetic determination and moral fervor that have little in common with the classical acceptance of the Great Cycle. What Justin and Augustine opposed in their polemics against the pagan view of history as a closed impersonal circle could not be revived in its original form by a thinker who was himself symptomatic of the modern alienation from nature and the restless cult of the ego. In the felt need to justify his central doctrine and even to give it his love and final allegiance—*amor fati* — Nietzsche unwillingly testified that the centuries from Socrates to his own day could not be canceled off by decree. His own convictions were a matter of willed belief and were essentially directed towards the future. However stridently he called for heroic thought on the theme of "the death of God," Nietzsche was unable to remove himself from the Christian context. What he demanded of those who would be his followers reads in places like a summons to sanctity, just as his description of the typical Christian reminds us with shame that the Pharisee did not pass away with the destruction of Jerusalem.

What Nietzsche takes away with the one hand, he returns with the other. Huszar remarks with great show of pathos that among nineteenth-century figures only the great Yea-sayer succeeded in overcoming pessimism without collapsing before the Cross like Kierkegaard. The Cross, *spes unica,* is said to be the great destroyer of life. And yet,

[5] "Nietzsche on the Philosopher," *Philosophical Review,* Vol. LIV, No. 2 (1945).

[6] "Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)," *Church History,* Vol. XIII, No. 3 (1944).

at formula is offered by Dionysus for making a man vitally heroic? o face simultaneously one's greatest suffering and one's highest hope." nilarly, a craving for security is taken as characteristic of the slave ntality which our civilization and its religion have fostered in us. d yet the great blessing which Zarathustra imparts to his loyal few the gift of celestial serenity, for he will stand as a heaven and a nd roof, as the azure bell and eternal security guarding his faithful their denial of God. Nietzsche justified his about-face with the magic rd "transvaluation." Strikingly akin to his legerdemain is the ategy being used by an important group of American thinkers whose gic word today is "scientific method."

II. NATURALISM IN THE LISTS

After the famous purging of Santayana from the ranks of the faithful the midtwenties, the followers of Dewey were careful to remove any gering tendencies towards idealism or transcendental dualism. At the ne time, the need was felt to extend instrumentalism systematically to areas of human life. This would secure the tactical advantage a comprehensive and generous approach to all that men have prized st, without requiring the sacrifice of basic convictions on public ification and the continuity of knowledge. Conflict with other standints and with unamenable institutions was inevitable and was only stened in recent years by our increased national concern for the rvival and development of democracy. The division became evident the early meetings of the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and ligion. Dewey took alarm at statements by Adler, Hutchins, and ups like the Princeton professors. It seemed to him that here was "authoritarian attempt to capture education" in America, a hearken- back to medieval ways of thinking in outmoded supernaturalist ys. At the recent counterconferences on the scientific spirit and nocratic faith,[7] it has been *de rigeur* to begin discussion with an ack upon the cryptofascism of the Catholic Church and the obirantism of the Chicago school and to launch out thereafter into praise democracy and its stoutest support, the scientific method.

An extreme counterstatement is often the price paid for an original e-sided version of the truth. Careless publicists following in Dawson's d Maritain's wake have been contending that the *only* historical irce and defender of democracy is Christianity. From the group eting in New York comes the contrary assertion that historically

[7] Cf. the proceedings of conferences: *The Scientific Spirit and Democratic th* (New York, 1944) and *The Authoritarian Attempt to Capture Education* ew York, 1945).

democracy has been in essence associated not with established religio but *only* with the growth of the scientific spirit. Whatever the passion of wartime, they do not excuse taking advantage of patriotism in orde to advance a cause through the statement of half-truths. In his earlie books like *Beyond Politics* and *The Modern Dilemma,* Christophe Dawson offers a more balanced and honest account of the origins an prospects of democracy without attempting any partisan interpretatio which might lead to the contrary presentation of history as a conflic between "democratic" science and religion. Neither element in ou tradition bears sole responsibility — for woe or weal — for our presen social and political situation. Nor would either accept uncriticize the current conception of democracy, as these opposing spokesme seem to assume. There is a special danger here for Catholics, who ar liable to fall into the error Newman warned against of grounding belie in the Church on the wrong reason. Whatever the good it does toward temporal society, this is neither the essential mission nor the motiv for belief in the Church. It stands no more than it falls on suc grounds.

The controversy has been continued along more philosophical bu scarcely less sectarian lines in a manifesto against "the new failure c nerve," which first appeared in the pages of *Partisan Review* and wa expanded into book form in the symposium on *Naturalism and th Human Spirit.*[8] Appearing in the last days of 1944, this joint volum was the center of an important discussion from several quarters durin 1945. Reminiscent of the initial symposia which introduced new an critical realism in America, this book contains essays in support of common outlook by outstanding contemporary philosophers like Dewe Lamprecht, Hook, Edel, Schneider, Nagel, Dennes, Larrabee, an Randall. It will be instructive to examine the critical reports made o the book by men of such diverse standpoints as Rudolf Allers, Arthu E. Murphy, E. S. Brightman, and W. H. Sheldon. Whatever their ow positions, these reviewers have reached conclusions that corroborat and complement each other in a remarkable way.[9]

Allers is not only a Scholastic philosopher, but the only one participa ing in this discussion who is a doctor of medicine with practic experience in chemistry, experimental psychology, and psychiatry. Y his main point is that the naturalists must turn somewhere else than science itself for their epistemological presuppositions and value judg

[8] Ed. by Y. Krikorian (New York, 1944).

[9] Cf. the reviews of the Krikorian volume by R. Allers, *New Scholasticis* Vol. XIX, No. 1 (1945); E. S. Brightman, *Phil. Rev.*, Vol. LIV, No. 4 (1945) A. E. Murphy, *Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. XLII, No. 15 (1945). Also s

nts. Though science gives knowledge about the real world, it nowhere ntains the proposition that its findings are alone valid in the field of owledge and alone give a comprehensive view of that world. The ll-known distinction between the scientific and the common-sense orlds" indicates a problem which cannot be resolved fundamentally terms of but one of these descriptions of things. There is a meaning "science" wider than the body of knowledge yielded by the scientific thod alone. For instance, it can be known with certainty that re is a brotherhood among men and that a man should treat his lows as befits their common human dignity. Is this brotherhood "biological fact," as Hook would have it? In precise language, as lers points out, it is not a taxonomic fact and indeed is no fact at . It is a concept which does not depend primarily upon classification biological evidence but upon a moral conviction arising from what can know of man's "essence" (to appropriate Schneider's daringly ditional usage). From the empirical and nonbiological fact that man s a history, we can recognize his uniqueness among living species. it neither the necessities of biological law nor a survey of common cial trends can provide the ethical *ought* which faces us when we must ely decide upon our conduct towards others.

According to Brightman, even the naturalists must come to admit at for complete knowledge we need to supplement descriptive science th the methods of normative science.[10] Brightman's position in regard this volume is a delicate one. The book's message is not only that should rely upon free rational inquiry in our study of man, but so that no other philosophical view except naturalism provides a truly tional and human outlook. Strictly, this would disqualify whatever mment might be offered by this distinguished personal idealist and ilosopher of religion. Nevertheless, even the children of light might ofit by his suggestions, criticisms, and conciliatory gestures. Because Dewey's philosophical forbears and some remarks on the genesis of turalism in the Krikorian book, it is not surprising that Brightman ould find several points of sympathetic contact between idealism and

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H. Sheldon, "Critique of Naturalism," *ibid.*, No. 10, and the joint reply by wey, Hook, and Nagel, "Are Naturalists Materialists?," *ibid.*, No. 19. Allers s continued the discussion in "Does Human Nature Change?," *Catholic University Bulletin*, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1946).

[10] For two recent attempts to show that value judgments and prescriptive ral laws are scientific, cf. M. Beck, "Are Value Judgments Unscientific?," *il. Rev.*, Vol. LIV, No. 1 (1945), and H. Veatch, "Concerning the Distinction ween Descriptive and Normative Science," *Philosophy and Phenomenological search*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (1945).

naturalism. Both schools show a predilection for categories of activi life, consciousness, and even teleology and anticipatory response of mi This is in harmony with the stated opposition of the naturalists to o fashioned hard materialism. Yet they still retain the old-fashioned bel in the omnicompetence of science, faith in the universal and univo applicability of scientific method. The coauthors agree that th unity is one of attitude and temper, rather than of thought and positi doctrinal content. Now this may be sufficient to issue a program broa side with enthusiastic verve, but it is hardly enough to launch or susta a philosophical movement. The empirical *fact* of this belief is to admitted upon testimony and may even cause edification in a faithl age. But its worth should be shown with at least as much logi rigor as is demanded of religious-minded people who attempt to just their beliefs.[11]

That the naturalistic authors have failed in this respect is the co clusion of Murphy's critique. He is rightly placed on his guard by th claim of sole right to the name of philosopher. For such a claim be warranted, proof would have to be advanced that there is but o type of knowledge and but one legitimate method of obtaining t knowledge — by the continuity of scientific analysis. The word "co tinuity" is a deceptive one, for it seems to rule out mechanical ident of procedure in various cases without, on the other hand, positiv allowing for an analogical diversification of approaches. Yet so such adjustment of method is required even on naturalist premises a simplistic reductionism is to be avoided. Where differential tra in subject matters and distinctive levels of structural organization a behaviour are admitted, a corresponding adaptation of methods analysis is called for. In a widely different intellectual situati Aristotle was forced to make room for a pluralistic view of meth within the embracing field of scientific knowledge. The naturali seem to fear that the general requirements for verifiable assertion wo be jeopardized if such differences of procedure were admitted tod This would be the case only if verification were necessarily univocal its signification. To assume this is to hinder progress precisely those hitherto untouched fields where naturalists are eager to ap themselves. In concrete instances, they must either offer substit

[11] For a critical account of Bertrand Russell's similarly double-standard tr ment of religion and science, cf. R. Demos, "Mr. Russell and Dogmatis *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLII, No. 22 (1945). It is noteworthy that editor of an idealist manifesto of a few years ago declared that idealism "is an attitude, not a creed" (C. Barrett [ed.], *Contemporary Idealism in Ame* [New York, 1932], p. 14).

lyses of anger, let us say, or else remain as helpless before this state did the reductionist, Rudolf Carnap.[12]

Only one essay in the Krikorian collection attempts a serious justification of the single-method theory of truth: William Dennes's "The tegories of Naturalism."[13] He argues that the real is characterized three basic categories: event, quality, and relation. All interpretation nature must be made in terms of these three categories, which also ve as a criterion for true method. If a proposition requires for its ification the use of other interpretants or pseudocategories, we have mary evidence of its falsity in this very need to invoke non-uralistic categories. An immediate corollary drawn by Dennes from theory of categories is that nature is self-contained. The only valid plication of the present group of events which face us is a further in of similar events, which in turn will possess various qualities and er into various immanent relations. In principle, then, naturalism rule out the search for a cause that would transcend the empirical nts so given with their qualities and relations. Yet the writer hastens add that acceptance of this *Kategorienlehre* entails a purely methodic nmitment: it determines procedure but pledges the naturalist beforehand to no positive doctrinal content or hypothesis. The philosophical nouncement still remains neutral with regard to the further determinations of nature. This task naturalism leaves to the particular sciences performs itself in a fashion that differs in no way essentially from e common scientific procedure.

Such reasoning is recognized by Murphy to be both essential to e entire position and also a precise instance of question-begging in ilosophy. The freedom which naturalism allows to investigators is drastically limited and even trivial one. We are allowed to range er the whole field of reality — but we are told in advance that only ose objects we encounter are to be credited as real which conform the categories already laid down as constituting reality. Any hypothesis can be framed about given facts so long as it can be tested by entific methods, which methods *alone* can verify genuine knowledge

[12] Cf. Carnap's attempt to define anger according to the canons of logical piricism: "Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science," *International cyclopaedia of Unified Science*, ed. by O. Neurath, Vol. I, No. 1 (Chicago, 8), pp. 56 ff. The exact relation between logical empiricism and naturalism s not yet been made clear. It is difficult to see how the reductionism of the rmer school differs in any practical way from the continuity of analysis of latter. Among recent treatments of the problem of scientism from widely ferent standpoints, cf. A. J. McNicholl, "Science and Philosophy," *Thomist*, l. VIII, No. 1 (1945), and L. Norris, "Is Science Explanatory?" *Personalist*, l. XXVI, No. 2 (1945).

[13] *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, pp. 270-94.

since they are the methods dictated by an exclusive acceptance of the naturalistic categories! The theist who is invited to submit public evidence for his doctrines finds that the case has already been decided against him by this prior judgment as to what will constitute real evidence and public verification. Because of the current prejudice against metaphysics, however, the naturalists are slow to recognize or at least to admit the metaphysical bias which is prior to and determinative of their method. Unfortunately, no philosophical ground has yet been offered for selecting these categories and no others. The symposium under consideration is rather an *Enchiridion Fidei contra Gentiles*, a handbook of apologetics against the unregenerate who fail to adore scientific method as understood by the naturalists themselves. It should not cause surprise that its only definite stand is a negative one against supernaturalism. There is little else left for philosophy proper to do once it has sung the praises of what it takes to be scientific method except to excoriate the stiff-necked who remain unconvinced and set in their illusions. When Murphy exhorts the naturalists to begin the real work of philosophy with a rational defense of their chosen categories, he is asking them to remove themselves to a prenaturalistic terrain. This is where the true neutrality is to be found, and where theories on the nature of reality can be discussed on their own merits without benefit of extraphilosophical prestige.

Two further aspects of naturalism must be mentioned. Its negative mark is opposition to all forms of "supernaturalism." Under this designation are grouped all doctrines on God as a transcendent being, immortality, spiritual natures, and cosmic design. Nothing is mentioned about the traditional Catholic meaning of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural which would place all of the above-mentioned "supernaturalist" notions within the natural order of reason and hence within the legitimate scope of philosophy. Even where the supernatural order is not reckoned with, as in Aristotle, nature is still held to include the immaterial human soul, to exhibit finality, and to require a ground outside the natural events themselves. A metaphysics of substance cannot be disqualified as nonnatural and nonscientific for encountering and including more in nature than Dewey and the others are prepared to admit. The conflict goes a good deal deeper than an alleged overstepping of the limits of nature: what is in question is the very scope of the natural and of philosophic reason.

Another claim of naturalism has been challenged by Sheldon in his vigorous assault in the *Journal of Philosophy* itself. Most philosophies since Descartes have tried to make capital of the contrast between the unified scientific tradition and the notoriously contentious record of the

ilosophers. A philosophy which could achieve unanimity by over-
ning these differences would presumably be a more comprehensive
e and nearer to the scientific ideal of public truth. Without challeng-
g here the underlying assumption about the nature of philosophical
quiry and truth, it is even questionable whether naturalism does
nscend the old antitheses between the schools. From a careful study
their own admissions about the equivalence of the levels of matter
th the grades of actuality, Sheldon maintains that American naturalism
only an up-to-date or softened form of materialism, and hence that
only perpetuates the quarrels which have distracted and discredited
ilosophers for so long. By the terms of the method to which it is
edged, this philosophy can admit as real only those events, relations,
d qualities which result from and remain intrinsically dependent upon
e various dispositions of matter.

The Dewey-Hook-Nagel rejoinder to this charge is a curious document.
good deal is made of the distinction between rigid mechanistic and
ductionist materialism and the more supple and hospitable non-
ductionist materialism which can make room for practically any mani-
station of the human spirit, just so long as that spirit itself is either
iminated or taken metaphorically. This reformed and cautious mate-
alism "maintains that the occurrence of a mental event is contingent
on the occurrence of certain complex physico-chemico-physiological
ents and structures — so that no pains, no emotions, no experiences
beauty or holiness would exist unless bodies appropriately organized
ere also present."[14] Thus mental events are in contingent or causal
pendence upon physical ones and so are not substantially distinct from
em. It is noteworthy that contingency, causality, and (at least in a
gative way) substantiality are added in practice to the list of natu-
listic categories. It may be suggested that they can be derived from
e original category of relation. But whatever the reply to this
fficulty, the naturalists cannot sustain the claim that the empirical
idence is alone required to determine the nature of this relation.
ntingency and "causality" are not themselves empirical facts, even
ough facts may exemplify such concepts. Nor are they accessible in
eir formal signification to the scientific method as set forth by the
turalists themselves. Once they are admitted in their full *generality*,
wever, the metaphysical question of the contingency of nature as a
ole must again be reopened. The problem of the contingency of
tural events is as inescapable in its absolute sense as it is useful in
restricted sphere.

[14] *Art. cit.*, p. 519.

Aesthetic and religious experience laid aside for the present, it should be noted that the contingency of "mental" events like pains and emotions upon their physical basis is not a decisive argument for any variety of materialism. According to the Aristotelian-Thomistic teaching, such events require by definition the presence of the material subject for their occurrence. This throws considerable light upon the true position of naturalism. Contrary to Sheldon's verdict, it seems to me that naturalism, so far as it is capable of any definite characterization in its theory of man, is not so much materialistic as antidualistic. It has seen the inadequacy of formulating the anthropological problem in terms of a mind-body relation. It is justifiably puzzled about how the physical and the mental can enter into any causal relations if they are taken as exclusive disjuncts. It is understandably sceptical about the warrantable evidence for the existence of mind taken as an ethereal something, a disembodied consciousness which exists independently of spatio-temporal things but is somehow able to influence their behaviour. Nothing could be more sound than the dissatisfaction felt by the philosophical conscience in the face of such a dualistic account of human nature.

Yet what does naturalism offer in its stead? An equally extreme and artificial monism which would apparently place mind or mental events in "adverbial and adjectival" relation to the physical organism. This disconcerting grammatical usage, reminiscent of the ambiguities of logical positivism, forces us to inquire into the status of the physical "thing." Is it conceived as a substance having certain attributes, qualities, and relations? This is not to be expected in a professedly nonontological philosophy of process and events, which is also heir to the modern repudiation of substance. But at least the physical "thing" is primary in comparison to what is contingent upon it. The Dewey-Hook-Nagel article tries to clarify this relation by drawing an analogy from chemistry. The qualities of water appear only when the hydrogen and oxygen atoms are properly organized, but no chemist would say that these qualities are substantially distinct from and capable of existence independent of the original atoms. Similarly, mental qualities make their appearance only when the physical matter is organized at a certain level, but neither do these qualities constitute a third thing substantially distinct from and independent of physical events.

Several remarks are in order here. If hypothetical use is made of the older substance-accident terminology, then it should be recalled that in the traditional account no qualities whatever are conceived to be capable of independent existence. Mental as well as physical qualities were held to inhere in the substance. Moreover, the immaterial substantial principle in man was not taken as an ethereal complete being

hich enters into only extrinsic and accidental relation with the physical der. It was taught by the Schoolmen that human nature as we ncounter it empirically is a composite unity in which the immaterial rinciple is joined in intimate or "substantial" union with matter. Vhere the naturalists do not go beyond a verbal formula in referring matter as "properly organized on the right level" to give rise to ental events, the philosophers of being explained this organization of atter intrinsically (from within and not by caricature from without) nder the formative influence of man's immaterial factor, the actual principle in his nature. But on the other hand, neither did the older sage allow any independence to the physical events or qualities themelves. The naturalists are prejudicing the analysis when they refer the "atoms" or constitutive principles of human nature as *physical* ings or events. In that case, it would be obvious that the further rganization of these principles at various levels could only yield qualities aving intrinsic dependence upon the basis previously designated as xclusively physical. But if we ought not to hypostasize mental events, either ought we to hypostasize physical events. The naturalist investiation has yet to penetrate to the principles of organization operative n both cases. That mental events do occur in relation to and dependence pon the "thing," is only stating a truism. Empirical evidence, however, s not the warrant for the further statement that such events can nly occur in intrinsic dependence upon purely material structure. To add that matter must be properly organized is not to save the day vith a cautious qualification, but only to point out precisely the unanayzed area in this discussion.

A like evasion weakens the concluding remarks of Dewey *et alii* on he question of introspection. This mode of self-acquaintance has roved a stumbling block to the naturalist conception of scientific nethod, since it does not always fit the requirements laid down for ublic verifiability. Some observations which this article makes about ntrospection are eminently sane. Long ago, William James showed hat the most intimate way of examining one's self need be neither the nost accurate nor the most comprehensive. Furthermore, the private vorld of self can be discovered in many instances by the acute observer vho can read the message conveyed by inadvertent gestures and the ike. But it is a long road from James to naturalism and to the ssertions that assured knowledge of the self must be at least in prinple publicly verifiable by the scientific method, and that such knowledge s not the product of mere introspective study.[15]

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 528-29.

Granting at once the important distinction between verifiability and actual verification, it is to be noted that this distinction does not forthwith settle the problem of introspection. Even the naturalists would seem to allow that we can have introspective knowledge apart from verification by others. There can, then, be some self-knowledge in the psychological order without having actual recourse to the findings of others. In point of empirical fact, we take this encounter to be not only an experience but cognitive experience as well. So far as the introspective subject is concerned, to know certain of his own states at least as occurrences is within his own power in an assured way. That such knowledge is limited in extent and may not enable him to judge reliably concerning all the qualities and relations of these states does not make it any the less cognitive for him. It is well-grounded acquaintance even though the work of other observers may be required to supply a knowledge of other events or even of the exact structure and context of the introspectively ascertainable events themselves. There is a bare minimum of introspective knowledge which can be gained without requiring actual verification by scientific observers. This conclusion is independent of whether or not the world of introspection is a private one inaccessible to other investigators. What is important is that it is a world of knowledge belonging to the individual and determined as knowledge apart from verification by others.

Does it belong to him legitimately in principle as well as in fact? This question is directed at the logical foundation of knowledge of self. The naturalists maintain that introspection gives knowledge only in virtue of the public scientific verifiability of its assertions. This position is not sufficiently stated when some verifiability is held to be essential to knowledge. No acquaintance with one's mental events can be treated as introspective knowledge unless there is ground in the very events for verification by oneself. There is also a *de jure* public verifiability attaching to such knowledge in so far as the evidence which is sufficient to warrant an assertion on the part of a particular knower is deemed capable of assuring other observers to whom it could be likewise presented. Here the validity of the evidence need not depend on whether real conditions could in principle be devised under which the hypothetical observers might make their tests. It is the evidence already known to one perceiver which would determine the common study, not the accessibility to several investigators which would render the data true evidence. Hence it is something else to demand that the verifying principle be public *in a scientific way*. Scientific verifiability as advanced by the naturalists again presupposes a theory of the real and requires justification just as much as the other suppositions of the

naturalistic method. This must be done before the private-view theory of mind can be criticized and the conditions determined for introspective knowledge. It is especially here that a rigid use of method can solve difficulties only by denying their existence.

The length of this notice of naturalism can only be justified by the radical claims of naturalism and by the quality of the discussion which has aroused in various quarters. In Mr. Murphy's considered judgment, naturalism as expressed in the Krikorian manifesto is an unhappy instance of what Peirce called procedures which block the path of inquiry. Important contributions have been made recently towards the understanding of Peirce's own position and that of some allied thinkers.

III. STUDIES ON WRIGHT AND PEIRCE

The main features of American intellectual history are only now being made firm in such synthetic works as Merle Curti's *The Growth of American Thought*.[16] That portion of our cultural history which deals with the growth of American philosophy contains certain sections in which the filiation of ideas has been only tentatively outlined. The middle decades of the nineteenth century saw the impact of Darwin's and Spencer's theories upon all phases of our national life and outlook. Their effect upon social thought has been expertly traced by R. Hofstadter in a recent monograph[17] which shows the conflicting interpretations of the bearing of evolution upon social development. American students were by no means in unanimous agreement with William Graham Sumner in emphasizing the traits of individualism and unrestrained competition which suited the era of laissez-faire corporations. For continuity, interdependence, and co-operation could also be stressed in favor of a more socially responsible attitude.

Even more symptomatic of the true intellectual issues at stake was the reception of Darwinism by the theologians and those scientists and philosophers whose interests were touched by the religious forces in America. A preliminary sketch of this aspect of the problem has been presented by Herbert W. Schneider in a survey of some representative midnineteenth-century opinions on evolution and religion.[18]. Schneider distinguishes four positions which were held at various times during the controversy. The first of these solutions attempted to separate science and religion so completely that no conflict was in principle possible between their authentic teachings. Hence by controversialists like Orestes Brownson and Asa Gray, evolution was taken as a philosophical

[16] New York, 1943.

[17] *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, 1860-1915 (Philadelphia, 1944).

[18] "The Influence of Darwin and Spencer on American Philosophical Theology," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. VI, No. 1 (1945).

theory rather than a scientific finding and was assayed from this standpoint. This is still the position of most Catholic writers, although today many of them — like Descoqs — have pushed the argument against transformism into the scientific realm as well by examining the testimony of scientists concerning findings in their own field. The two dominant reactions to evolutionism came from the Presbyterians and the Unitarians, who sought to reconcile evolution as an accepted fact with their own theological suppositions. Typical of the former group was James McCosh, President of Princeton and the last but quite articulate representative of that Scottish school of realism which John Witherspoon had brought to Princeton a century before. He professed to see in natural selection a secularized version of the Calvinist doctrine on divine election, predestination, and special providence. In his eyes biological struggle and the emergence of individuals with the power to survive are a natural likeness of the religious life with its strenuous search for moral power. But here as well as in the sphere of social theory, the partisans of a more "liberal" kind of theology felt the dangers of interpreting human as well as animal existence in terms of unrestrained competition. Consequently, the nineteenth-century Protestant world was also offered the milder Spencerian teaching in suitable native dress by the historian and cosmic philosopher John Fiske. For him evolution meant the gradual emergence of order from chaos, the manifestation of a divine plan which would expose the strictly temporary and relative nature of evil and imperfections. Peirce's own characteristic doctrine of evolutionary love bears some resemblance to this meliorism, although Peirce's conception was closely linked to more naturalistic considerations.

Schneider has pointed out still another response to Darwinism, that offered by Chauncey Wright. Only tardily is Wright being assigned his proper place in American philosophy. Apart from an occasional mention, he did not receive separate treatment in general histories until 1939, when a chapter was devoted to him in Anderson and Fisch's *Philosophy in America*.[19] Even in this belated notice, as well as in a previous essay by Gail Kennedy, Wright was studied mainly for his bearing upon the later growth of pragmatism and naturalism in our country. In tracing the more immediate origins of pragmaticism, Peirce was wont to include Wright among the members of his so-called Metaphysical Club in Cambridge, referring to him as the "boxing-master" who submitted the company to severe intellectual pummelings at each session. Apart from this historical perspective, Wright is note-

[19] New York, 1939, ch. xviii.

orthy in his own right for his attempt to reconcile Mill and Darwin. is stand in the controversy on evolution has been traced in detail r the first time by Philip Wiener in a valuable contribution to the story of American philosophy.[20] To use Schneider's succinct formula, 'right sought to restrict evolutionary theory to particular scientific oblems, to keep religion within the practical moral order, and to sure a place for philosophy independent of (but relevant for) both ligion and science. Wiener's investigation brings out clearly Wright's oughts on the first two parts of this program.

Any reader of Wright's philosophical remains is struck at once by s close reasoning, his intellectual honesty, and the thoroughness with hich he applied his general convictions. These qualities of mind ecome apparent in considering his attitude towards evolution. He is ie only participant in the discussion who, to my knowledge, both serted and consistently supported in practice the religious and philo- phical neutrality of science. His sincere aim was to secure the ght of free inquiry for the natural sciences without hindrance from her quarters. For many scientists and philosophers of science, such stated intent has only served as the mask for a new kind of dogmatism n antireligious or antimetaphysical grounds. But Wright was as oposed to the materialism and *Lebensphilosophie* which sought bolster- ng from Darwin as he was to the cosmic speculations which would nlist evolution in the theistic and spiritualistic ranks. Evolution and volutionism he saw to be by no means the same. The scientific theory as based upon a particular set of biological facts and should be cau- ously limited to that field instead of being extended by questionable nalogy to philosophical problems. Although he himself offered an volutionist explanation of the growth of self-consciousness, he refused s a scientist to deny or depreciate the irreducible difference between ind and matter. Our contemporary naturalists might well ponder s distinction between matter as a condition for mental events and as nstitutive of the latter.

Wright's own conception of philosophy was never worked out thor- ughly. The critical function of philosophy as the watchdog of the arious methods for gaining valid knowledge was insisted upon, but e did not specify very closely the content of philosophical doctrine self. A definite shortcoming is his view of religion as a practical oral discipline without any theoretical content, a contention similar that of Spinoza and one having a similiarly irenic purpose. Appar-

[20] "Chauncey Wright's Defense of Darwin and the Neutrality of Science," *urnal of the History of Ideas,* Vol. VI, No. 1 (1945).

ently, Wright held that the only significant statements about man's nature and destiny are those made by philosophy and, in a more limited way, the natural sciences. He is taken to task by Wiener for being led by his belief in the neutrality of the scientific method to isolate his ethical opinions from his scientific interests. Wiener maintains that Wright's naturalism should have been extended to his ethics. In this suggestion is implicit the program of contemporary naturalism. From the earlier thinker's standpoint, however, certain qualifications would be necessary, if the spirit of neutrality is to be preserved. Wright was fundamentally a pluralist in methodology and recognized the abstraction and the dangers involved in the term "scientific method." The various methods in the sciences were adapted to and limited by the peculiar subject-matters for which they were designed. Any scientific treatment of the moral order would, then, require a method which respects the kind of evidence under consideration. Moreover, we have seen in the previous section that naturalism as now understood is by no means synonymous with neutral scientific procedure. Its philosophical presuppositions must still be examined for their own sake and must be carefully distinguished from the scientific findings in the sphere of ethical conduct as well as elsewhere.

The distinction between the neutrality of science and the commitments of naturalism can be readily seen in Wiener's passing references to Peirce. The latter fares badly by comparison with Wright, since he is charged with having forsaken scientific austerity for loose indulgence in a priori metaphysical theorizing (in refreshing contrast to which naturalism is said to avail itself only of working hypotheses). Because he did not qualify his statements on continuity and law sufficiently to allow Wiener to find there an anticipation of the Bohr theory, Peirce is marked as a loose thinker in his metaphysical moments! Special charges of apriorism—can there be a metaphysics of logic *and* experience?—are reserved for such distinctive doctrines as Peirce's categories of law, evolutionary love, and chance.

An attempt has been made by Frances Hamblin to offset just such an easy dismissal of Peirce's notion of chance as mere metaphysical woolgathering.[21] His tychism was formulated in opposition to the necessitarian view of the complete determination of all future events by the present state of affairs, together with certain immutable laws. It was a needed reminder for the ironclad mechanists that methodological postulates remain postulates, no matter how convenient and indispensable they become in our research. The verification of natural laws is by

[21] "A Comment on Peirce's Tychism," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLII, No. 14 (1945).

vay of approximation and probability, which meant to Peirce that in ny exact and detailed range of instances there is always room for xception, change, and departure from the established laws. If the alidity of Peirce's metaphysical doctrine is to be measured by its dvance conformity with later scientific trends, then it should be pointed ut that for him a constant chance factor was also one of the elements n the continuity of events.

Is the tychistic principle predictable, and if not, can it have any value or science? These are the questions which Mrs. Hamblin poses. The ndamental problem is whether there is a sense in which chance could e taken as predictable. Events cannot be explained by chance in the rdinary Peircean use of the term as signifying brute unrelated fact, or nordered distribution of a collection of things, or coincidental encoun- er of events determined by independent systems. In the case of the irst two meanings of chance, it is evident that they can provide no rinciple of explanation. But Mrs. Hamblin has not fully examined he possibilities of coincidence as a predictive use of tychism. For t is not equivalent to say that an event due to coincidence cannot be leduced from the character of a given single system, and to say that he explanation cannot be made from a single general law. The single ystems are themselves constructed according to particular perspectives, nd it is from the standpoint of these limited perspectives that the vent is taken as a coincidence. But the logic of perspectives would ead us to inquire into the possibility of including the lesser viewpoints vithin a more general systematic framework, since the lesser systems re at least known to belong to the one universe of experience. At this nore inclusive level, the correlation between the particular systems would tself be subject to determination. Whether this explanation could e a deductive one is a further question. In any case, Mrs. Hamblin oes on to indicate a fourth meaning of chance, one only hinted at by Peirce in an incidental way. This is to include chance under the category f thirdness or law, since the whole range of departures and irregu- arities is itself in some degree regular and hence subject to calculation. Continual breach of law can itself acquire some of the habits of law and rovide a ground of explanation or at least expectation in reckoning vith events.

One of the closest students of Peirce, James Feibleman, has added nother essay to the growing list which the *Journal of Philosophy* is ublishing from time to time in the present concerted attempt to recover nd evaluate Peirce's total outlook.[22] Not even Duns Scotus exerted so

[22] "Peirce's Use of Kant," *ibid.* During 1945 there was held a memorial meet- g in Peirce's honor at Milford, Pennsylvania (where he spent the last third of

great a formative influence over Peirce's mind as did Kant. Peirce invariably included him among the great thinkers who led him to pragmaticism. Yet Peirce himself was no neo-Kantian, as Feibleman shows, although he sometimes carried Kant's plans to completion where his predecessor had not succeeded. Where Kant gave up the hope of constructing a valid metaphysics, Peirce saw keenly that the strictures of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* told only against the current rationalistic versions of first philosophy, and that Kant's own arguments were often based upon a narrow faulty logic at the most critical points. Hence the American thinker's intense lifelong interest in logic. On the basis of an exact logic he thought it possible to erect an exact and systematic metaphysics. Peirce was like Kant in recognizing the limits both of pure rationalism and of pure empiricism. Moreover, they agreed that valid knowledge would have to spring from the marriage and closest union of logic and experience. Such valid knowledge is found even in the syllogism, Peirce affirmed, and in so doing reversed the whole tide of destructive criticism aimed at this method since the Cartesian attack. Peirce would go even further than some modern Scholastic defenders of syllogistic reasoning by allowing it to be a fit instrument of discovery as well as logical verification. The parting of the ways between Kant and Peirce came when the latter followed up the realist modifications in the second edition of the *Kritik*. A revision was called for both in regard to the notion of thing-in-itself and in regard to the meaning of idea. When philosophy follows the scientific method closely, it is bound to consider the search for knowledge as being directed toward objects which are independent things rather than limiting concepts of objectivity. Of these things we can have direct experience in a limited but progressive way. Experience and reason, however, must function inseparably, so that in actual fact we never have the one or the other in splendid isolation. The implication drawn from this by Peirce is that the ideas of reason are just as closely integrated with perception as are the categories of the understanding. Furthermore, the cognitive operation in all its phases is no longer to be taken as constitutive of experience in the absolute Kantian sense. Ideas are not merely unitive notions aspiring to transcendence, but are definitions of classes of things which have existence as objects of real experience. There is thus a real foundation in actual instances for the generalized statements with which metaphysics deals. Kant's *Prolegomena* was taken by Peirce to be a genuine preface rather than an inscription of Inferno advising us to abandon hope in the possibility of any future metaphysic.

his life), as a result of which the Charles S. Peirce Memorial Society was founded.

It was clearly beyond Feibleman's purpose as a historian to pass udgment upon Peirce's use of Kant. Some aspects of it, however, vould not go unchallenged by Kant himself. The most important of hese questionable interpretations is the nature of experience itself. Peirce sometimes switches to the standpoint of "psychologistic" British mpiricism when he contrasts it with logic and reason. The whole mport of Kant's critical efforts was to offer a new conception of *Erfahrung* which would transcend the older contrast between rationalism nd empiricism. His point was not that experience *and* any other prin-iple gives valid knowledge, but that experience is the co-operate work f all the valid principles of knowledge, and that experiential knowledge s the only genuine knowledge (in the emphatic sense of *Erkenntnis*). Kant also recognized some retroactive effect of the ideas upon the ategories and forms of knowledge. But his greatest concern was with he unity of experience, which he could only account for by grounding ll cognitive powers and factors in the single transcendental subject. Peirce has indicated another possible solution to this problem, but one vhich requires a realistic interpretation of scientific procedure. The ossibility of unified experience, and so of unified science, can be looked or in the actual existents we experience. For they are capable of sup-orting our definitions of classes and even our idea of "the world," with-ut our having recourse to consciousness-in-general. It is evident that his problem is far wider than that of Kant's textual meaning.[23]

IV. SHORTER NOTICES

1. *De Koninck contra Eschmann.* Readers of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will recall the controversy over personalism which egan its American phase in the pages of this journal in 1945. Jules Baisnée attempted to give a statement and criticism of the recent loctrines on personalism, using as his guide the critiques which had reviously been written by Descoqs and De Koninck. A reply was oon forthcoming from I. Th. Eschmann, who felt that the position f Jacques Maritain was under fire and ought to be defended openly.[24] Since the controversy centered largely about the import of Charles De Koninck's *De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes*[25] nd the competency of his interpretation of the text of St. Thomas, some

[23] On the agreement between the scientific theory of probability and Peirce's ragmaticism—in contrast to the pragmatism of William James—cf. J. Feible-nan, "Pragmatism and Inverse Probability," *Phil. and Phenom. Research,* ol. V, No. 3 (1945).

[24] J. Baisnée, "Two Catholic Critiques of Personalism," THE MODERN CHOOLMAN, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (1945). I. Th. Eschmann, "In Defense of acques Maritain," *ibid.,* No. 4.

[25] 1st ed.; Quebec, 1943.

reply was obviously required from De Koninck himself. The doyen of the philosophy faculty at Laval University in Quebec has discharged his intellectual duty through the journal of his own University.[26] In a detailed reply of over a hundred pages in length, De Koninck has taken up the disputed points raised in the Eschmann article. A French version of this article will appear as an added chapter in the revised and augmented second edition of *De la primauté*. Scholastic philosophers will want to weigh carefully this latest phase of the present controversy over the meaning and place of the common good.

2. *Aristotelian-Scholastic Philosophy.* Students who are familiar with the usual American periodical sources of information on medieval philosophy—the *New Scholasticism, Traditio, Mediaeval Studies,* the *Thomist, Franciscan Studies, Speculum,* and this journal—will welcome the appearance of occasional studies on Scholastic philosophy in other periodicals. Those who have followed John Dewey's occasional excursions into the history of philosophy—especially in *The Quest for Certainty*—have been puzzled by his identification of Aristotle's notion of cognition with the spectator-theory of knowledge. This association has been questioned by John MacPartland, writing in the *Journal of Philosophy.*[27] The author shows that in many ways Aristotle comes close to the participation theory of knowledge which the instrumentalists champion. An interesting note on medieval speculation concerning whether or not Aristotle was saved has been contributed to the *Journal of the History of Ideas*[28] by Anton-Hermann Chroust. As a formal question, it is traced to an anonymous Franciscan author writing in the early part of the fourteenth century.

What can only be called an amazingly parochial comment on the meaning of matter for Greek and Christian thinkers is advanced by H. A. Overstreet in an issue of the *Journal of Philosophy.*[29] With great show of originality, the author bids us look upon matter as "the area of opportunity for the realization of spiritual values," thus re-echoing Louis Lavelle, Gabriel Marcel, and a host of other philosophers who have not found the incarnational outlook incompatible with Christian values (to speak only negatively).

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[26] "In Defense of Saint Thomas: A Reply to Father Eschmann's Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good," *Laval théologique et philosophique,* Vol. I No. 2 (1945).

[27] "Aristotle and the Spectator Theory of Knowledge," Vol. XLII, No. 1 (1945).

[28] "A Contribution to the Medieval Discussion: *Utrum Aristoteles Sit Salvatus,*" Vol. VI, No. 2 (1945).

[29] "The Word Becomes Flesh," *Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. XLII, No. 1 (1945); see the criticism of this article by several readers, *ibid.,* No. 24.

The *Philosophical Review* has been printing a discussion[30] between Villiam Elton and Charles Hartshorne concerning the latter's formula- ion of the ontological argument for God's existence. Hartshorne's roposed revision of the idea of God and consequently of the proof equired to establish God's existence is well known. Some of the diffi- ulties involved in his syllogisms are considered by Elton. The ontolog- cal argument still continues to attract attention and to receive support nder howsoever revised a form. Apart from the immediate issue of his discussion and of recent book reviews by Hartshorne, it should be emarked that the distinction which he draws with great éclat between pantheistic and a panentheistic conception of God is neither novel nor lecisive. In German philosophical circles it has long been in use and as been analyzed with care by such Catholic authors as Przywara and Karrer. Although panentheism points to a middle position between *leism* and pantheism, it is of no help by itself in deciding the issue etween pantheism and a deistic philosophy of participation in being. This question must be solved on more specific grounds than the Pauline ffirmation that in God we live and move and have our being. Both theism of participation and pantheism accept this statement, but the lispute arises concerning the manner in which all things are in God, .e., concerning the further specification of panentheism.

Two suggestive articles of special interest to Scholastics appeared in 945 in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.* One of these is a tudy of William of Occam by the Russian historian of philosophy, D. V. Trachtenberg.[31]

It has been the policy of the above journal to translate representative hilosophical articles from the Russian as an aid to intellectual com- nerce. Most of these studies have dealt with systematic problems in sthetics, psychology, and logic, in which Soviet research has been mphasized. Trachtenberg approaches the history of philosophy from he standpoint of strictly orthodox dialectical materialism. Taking his ue from Marx's dictum that nominalism is the first expression of English materialism and of modern materialism in general, the author ries to justify the view that William of Occam is a forerunner of the ater dispute between materialists and idealists. His separation of hilosophy from theology and theocracy is taken as the first decisive tep towards the destruction of medieval Scholasticism as a social and ntellectual force. Support for the thesis is also sought in his nominalism, vith its empirio-sensist bias, and in his theory of the material world.

[30] Vol. LIV, Nos. 1 and 5 (1945).

[31] "William of Occam and the Prehistory of English Materialism," *Phil. nd Phenom. Research,* Vol. VI, No. 2 (1945).

None of the close textual analyses with which we are familiar in the studies by Moody, Boehner, and Pegis are present in this essay. But it does offer a general interpretation of Occam's significance which is worthy of further discussion in the pages of the same journal. The second article is a brief but stimulating comparative account of the conflicting approaches to existence made by Kierkegaard and Heidegger.[32] It is suggested that the philosophical mean between these dialectically opposed versions of existentialism is found in the "interiorized Scholasticism" of Pierre Rousselot, author of *The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas.*

3. *The Symposium as a Philosophical Tool.* In a concluding note it is worth mentioning that from Plato's day to our own the symposium has been found to be an efficient instrument of philosophical investigation. The co-operative work of several individuals discussing a common theme is an aid to thorough and unified exploration of problems from several standpoints. Mention has been made of the naturalist manifesto and the symposium held in honor of Nietzsche's centenary. Other shared studies during 1945 included the comments invited from a wide sampling of Americans by the Committee on the Function of Philosophy in Liberal Education, a joint report on international relations, a revaluation of the concept of progress, and extended inquiries into meaning and truth, and probability.[33] For at least one of these reviews, it is a settled policy to publish symposia in an effort to overcome the largely incidental arrangement of material in the average issue of a journal. It is hoped that other editors will encourage similar enterprises.

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[32] R. Harper, "Two Existential Interpretations," *ibid.*, Vol. V, No. 3 (1945).

[33] B. Blanshard (ed.), "From the Commission's Mailbag," *Philosophical Review,* Vol. LIV, No. 3 (1945); cf. B. Blanshard (ed.), *Philosophy in American Education* (New York, 1945); "A Discussion of the Theory of International Relations," *Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. XLII, No. 18 (1945); "The Idea of Progress and the Future of Man," *Personalist,* Vol. XXVI, Nos. 1 and 2 (1945); "A Symposium on Meaning and Truth: Discussion Continued," *Phil. and Phenom. Research,* Vol. V, No. 3 (1945); "A Symposium on Probability," *ibid.,* No. 4, and Vol. VI, No. 1 (1945).

THE FUNCTIONS OF INTELLECT AND WILL IN THE ACT OF FREE CHOICE

THE PROBLEM

Man enjoys freedom because of the lack of determination of his will. In placing an action, however, a determination is required. Whence is it? Does the will determine itself; that is, does it, by its own power, go from potency to act? That, of course, is impossible, since nothing can be reduced from potency to act except by a being in act. What, then, are the causes of this determination?

In this article we are not discussing the fact of the freedom of man. We here assume that it has been established. The problem here is: *How* does a free act occur; or, what is the metaphysical structure of the act of choice?

The rational appetite alone is not the source of man's freedom. It is true that the foundation of this freedom is the indetermination of the will; and it is also true, as we shall see, that the free act of choice belongs substantially to the will. But this will of man is the type of appetite that requires and somehow follows intellectual knowledge in order that it may act. What is the influence of this knowledge upon the formation of this act? In other words, what part in the essence of freedom does the intellect play in presenting the particular good that the appetite will follow? St. Thomas, speaking of the liberty of man, constantly uses the term *liberum arbitrium*—freedom of judgment and of choice—which seems to imply that the role of the intellect is important.

ACTIVE INDETERMINATION

We should state at the beginning of this discussion that the indetermination of the will—or its lack of determination—is not comparable to that of the possible intellect. The possible intellect is passive both in the order of exercise and of specification. It is actuated in the order of efficient causality by the action of the agent intellect and phantasm, and in the order of specification by the object. The indetermination of the will, on the contrary, is an *active indetermination,* or *active indifference.* It can be determined only in the order of specification. For the actuation of the will in the order of exercise is caused by the supreme mover, God. The motion, however, that is communicated to the will does in no way move it to one determined object. This is what we mean by active indifference, or active indetermination.

The question is: Can the will of itself, and without any knowledge from the intellect, determine itself to this or that operation? It cannot, of course; for the will is an appetite, not a cognoscitive faculty. In order to be determined to this or to that object, to will or not to will, to do what is right or what is wrong, knowledge is required. This knowledge is proffered by the intellect. The intellect, therefore, moves the will not in the order of efficient causality, but of specification. The will does not receive a "push" from the intellect. Rather, it is enticed, attracted, drawn by what the intellect proposes. To be more exact, we should say that *man* by his intellect knows the good and with his will loves and desires it. Now in describing the knowledge required for the determination of the will in the order of the object, Scholastic philosophers are wont to speak of the *ultimate practical judgment,* which precedes the act of choice in the order of nature. This judgment is not a mere assertion of the intellect. It looks to the action of the will. It does not say merely, "This is good"; but, "This is a good thing and one to be loved, to be desired, to be done."

Is the will, as the supreme appetite of man, able to move all the other faculties of man in the order of efficient causality? And is it therefore capable of a certain control over the intellect? In forming the last practical judgment, can the will direct the intellect to consider this object rather than the other, to see the good rather than the evil in a given object, and thus to determine the judgment that will specify the act of choice? This is a very delicate problem. Its solution will be found in an analysis of the interaction between intellect and will.

It must be said in the first place that while the intellect determines the will in the order of specification, the will moves the intellect to the exercise of its act. The reason for this is that the good in general is the object of the will. Now the true, which is the object of the intellect, is included in the universal good as a particular good. Consequently, the will as an efficient cause is able to move the intellect as well as the other powers of the soul. For the ends and perfections of every faculty are included under the objects of the will as particular goods, and the particular goods are contained in the general good.[1]

> A thing is said to move in two ways: first, as an *end,* as when we say that the end moves the agent. *In this way the intellect moves the will,* because the understood good is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an *agent,* as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. *In this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul.* The reason is that, wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which is related to the universal end moves the powers which refer to particular ends. . . . Now the object of the will

[1] Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *ST,* I-II, 9. 1.

> is the good and the end in general, whereas each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the *will* as an *agent moves all the powers* of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our choice.[2]

We must consider, morever, that since the object about which the will is to be determined is a particular good, the will is not necessitated to action. For every limited good may be viewed not only as a good but also as an evil, since it lacks perfection and there may consequently be found reasons for willing or not willing. "In all particular goods, reason can consider the nature of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the nature of an evil. In this way it can apprehend any single one of such goods as a thing to be chosen or to be avoided."[3] This text is revealing. The intellect guided by the will must consider either the good or the evil of the object. The outcome of this is that the ultimate practical judgment that results from such willful consideration determines the appetite to act or not to act in accordance with the direction it (the will) gave the intellect. The act of the will that is specified by this last judgment and accompanies it is called the act of *choice* (*electio*). The essence of freedom in man, therefore, will be found in the placing of these two acts of intellect and will respectively: namely, the ultimate practical judgment and the choice.

INTERACTION BETWEEN INTELLECT AND WILL

Before giving an analysis of these two most important acts of man, we should briefly consider the series of operations of intellect and will that precede, at least in the order of nature, and are the immediate preparation for placing such acts.

In the first place, the *end* must be perceived and loved. Whenever the intellect perceives the good—and this it must do, at least implicitly, in the perception of any particular good—the will is moved by God in the order of exercise. This first act of the will loving the end is necessarily specified by the first act of the intellect presenting the good in general. It is called *volition* and is not a free act. It need not always be an act distinct from that by which the will loves a particular good. It is not distinct whenever the will is moved to the end "as the reason for willing the means. For it is evident that the will is moved, by one and the same movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the means, and to the means themselves."[4] Whenever the will is moved to the end abso-

[2] *Ibid.*, I, 82. 4.
[3] *Ibid.*, I-II, 13. 6.
[4] *Ibid.*, 8. 3.

lutely and in itself, however, the act of volition is distinct from the other acts of the will "and precedes them in time; for example, a man first wills to have health and afterwards, having deliberated by what means he can be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him."[5]

The first apprehension of the end specifies the act of volition that is a necessary act of love for the end. This is followed by a second act of the intellect that is a realization of the end *as attainable*. This second apprehension differs from the first in this, that the initial concept did not consider the end as attainable but *as good* only. Another act of the will follows immediately. This act is called *intention*. "Intention is an act of the will in relation to the end."[6] It is not identical with the first act, volition. The reason is that volition considers the end absolutely, while intention "considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained. . . . For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we will to have it (volition), but that we will to reach it by means of something else (intention)."[7] What this something else may be has not as yet been determined. The means will have to be considered.

We shall now study the series of acts of intellect and will which look to the means rather than to the end. This series presents the psychological aspect of freedom in man.

"The end is the principle in practical matters because the nature of the means is taken from the end."[8] The end has been apprehended, loved, intended. But how can it be attained? A new act of the intellect is required, an act by which we shall inquire into the possible means to the end. This operation of the intellect is *counsel*. "Since, therefore, counsel is an inquiry, it is not of the end, but only of the means to the end."[9] What is to be the term of the inquiry, the deliberation which takes place in counsel? "The term of (this) inquiry is that which *is in our power to do at once*. For just as the end has the nature of a principle, so the means have the nature of a conclusion."[10]

After this counsel has been placed, the will follows with an act called *consent*. "Consent expresses a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than passive."[11] "It is the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it."[12] "Consent is the appli-

[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.*, 12. 1 ad 4.
[7] *Ibid.*, cf. *De Ver.*, 22. 13.
[8] *ST*, I-II, 14. 2.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*, 14. 6.
[11] *Ibid.*, 15. 3 ad 1.
[12] *Ibid.*, 15. 1.

ation of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the ower of him who causes the application."[13] It is, therefore, the desire of ne means. As yet, however, there has been no selection of one definite neans to be preferred to others. This will come in the act of choice. For

> choice includes an element that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to that thing to which something else is preferred; and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel, several means have been found conducive to the end; and since each of these meets with approval, consent has been given to each; but after approving of many (this is consent), we have given our preference to one by choosing it.[14]

Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent properly speaking is of nothing else but the means. . . . Hence the application f the appetitive movement[15] to the resolution[16] of counsel is consent."[17]

The sequence of operations of the intellect and will, which prepares the aculties for the last practical judgment and for the act of choice, are hus enumerated by St. Thomas. The order of action is this: first, there s the *apprehension* of the end (act of the intellect); then the desire or *olition* for the end; after this comes the realization of the *end as attainble* (intellect). This is followed by a desire for the end as the term owards which something is ordained, which desire is called *intention.* The intellect then reflects upon the means in general. This is the ct of *counsel,* which arouses immediately in the will a desire for the neans, a sort of general *consent.*

ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM IN MAN

We come, finally, to the analysis of freedom in man.[18] This clearly omprises operations of intellect and will, both in the order of the end nd in the order of the means. Seeing, however, that the underlying rinciples of interaction between intellect and will are the same in both rders, we shall need to consider these acts only in the order of the means.

[13] *Ibid.,* 15. 3.

[14] *Ibid.,* ad 3.

[15] St. Thomas speaks of a continuous movement of the will; that is, the initial mpetus in the order of exercise, which is from God, continues even to the last ct of fruition.

[16] *Resolution* here does not mean a moral intention to do certain actions. It as a logical and a very technical meaning, that is, of a principle which precedes n knowledge that which is later in the order of being. (Cf. *ST,* I-II, 14. 5.)

[17] *ST,* I-II, 15. 4.

[18] From this analysis, we exclude, of course, the first act of the intellect which erceives the particular good, as well as the first act of the will, volition, hich immediately follows. These acts are called by Scholastic writers *actus rimo-primi.* An important application of this distinction between the necessary nd free acts of reason should be noted. It deals with interior temptations. Our rst necessary reaction to many a forbidden object is one of love. Regarding hese first movements of the soul, whether in the passional or intellectual order, here can be no sin, since these acts are not free.

"When the acts of two faculties are ordered to one another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other."[19] In order, then, to understand the solution of our problem we must consider the causality between these two faculties, the intellect and the will. According to St. Thomas, their causality is *mutual;* that is, they act upon each other simultaneously. For this reason their causality may be analogously compared to that of matter and form. Like matter and form they act simultaneously and reciprocally. There is, however, this important difference. Matter and form are *intrinsic* formal and material causes. Now, while the influence of the intellect upon the will as it elicits the act of choice is that of a formal *extrinsic* cause, the will, on the contrary, acts in the order of efficient causality upon the intellect as it forms the ultimate practical judgment.

What is the result of this reciprocal influence? On the one hand the will, acting upon the intellect, causes it to consider the good that is in this object rather than the good in another.[20] Consequently, the ultimate practical judgment will affirm that *this* means is to be embraced in preference to all others. On the other hand the intellect, by presenting to the will this good as the better, will specify the act of the will, the act of choice. The outcome of this mutual causality is what we call the choosing, the free act of choice. It is free because its determination both in the order of specification and in the order of exercise have been caused by the will itself. For the will directs the intellect, which specifies; and the will, the agent, elicits the act of choice in the order of exercise. "For the act of choice is produced by one faculty (the will) in so far as it is related to the other (the intellect). Hence the Philosopher explains that choice is the act of the intellectual appetite or of the appetitive intellect."[21]

Where then is the freedom? In both faculties, but in a different manner. The act of choice, says St. Thomas, is *materially* an act of the will but *formally* an act of the intellect. That is to say, "the will tends to its object according to reason. *Substantially,* however, choice is not an act of reason but of the will. For choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen."[22]

The reason why some philosophers find this doctrine difficult to understand is that they transpose formal causality to the order of efficient

[19] *ST,* I-II, 14. 1.

[20] Even if "two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point of superiority, so that the will is turned towards that one rather than towards the other." (*Ibid.,* 13. 6 ad 3.)

[21] *De Ver.,* 24. 4.

[22] *ST,* I-II, 13. 1.

causality. Consequently they fail to understand the true meaning of this mutual and simultaneous causality. For this reason, they insist that the will does not need a practical judgment showing that this object, this act, is better or more suitable here and now. They would have the will — which is an appetite and therefore a noncognoscitive faculty — operate as if it were a complete intellectual supposit, capable of holding out against the conclusions of reason in the last practical judgment. This is contrary to the nature of the reasoning animal that is man.

The will is free to choose this or that, to act or not to act, to do moral good or moral evil. But it chooses this definite act precisely because the determination that comes from the ultimate practical judgment has been caused by its own influence upon the intellect in the formation of that judgment. "The will in a certain way moves reason by controlling its operation, and reason moves the will by proposing to it its object. And thus it is that each power is somehow informed by the other."[23] For this reason "the judgment about a particular thing to be done here and now can never be contrary to the appetite."[24] The choice therefore is free and not of natural necessity but "of consequence" (*consequentiae*). For it is necessarily connected with the practical judgment that is its last specific determination.[25]

CONCLUSIONS

1) The indetermination of the will is active; that is, the will, having been actuated by a divine motion, is in act to act. It needs only to be determined to a particular object or act.

2) The intellect, which determines the will in the order of specification or of the object, does so by the ultimate practical judgment, which moves (formally) the will to perform this definite act.

3) In the formation of the ultimate practical judgment the intellect depends upon the direction given to it by the will in the order of exercise.

"Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, since it is ordained to the end by reason, is materially an act of the will but formally an act of reason."[26]

> For two reasons it is clear that choice is directly an act of the will. First of all by reason of the object: for the proper object of choice is

[23] "Voluntas quodammodo movet rationem imperando actum eius, et ratio movet voluntatem proponendo ei obiectum suum, . . . ; et inde est quod utraque potentia potest aliqualiter per aliam informari." (*De Ver.*, 24. 6 ad 5.)

[24] "Iudicium de hoc particulari operabili, ut nunc, numquam potest esse contrarium appetitui." (*Ibid.*, 24. 2.)

[25] "Choice follows the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism." (*ST*, I-II, 13. 3.)

[26] *Ibid.*, 13. 3.

that which is ordered to the end, since it pertains to the nature of the good, which is the object of the will; indeed, the good is said to be an end in three ways: as the virtuous, as the pleasant, and, in reference to the end, as the useful. Secondly by reason of the act itself: for the choice is the final acceptance by which something is determined upon as an object of pursuit. This indeed does not pertain to the reason, but rather to the will; for however much our reason prefers one thing to another, still that thing is not actually accepted for operation in preference to the other until the will inclines more towards one than towards the other; in fact, the will does not of necessity have to follow the reason. Nevertheless, the choice is not solely an act of the will, but is related to the reason, inasmuch as there is present in choice something which is a property of the reason, namely, the comparison and preference of one thing to another. And this property, owing to the influence of the reason, is found in the act of the will, in so far as the reason proposes something to the will as useful not in the absolute sense but as more useful to the attainment of the end.[27]

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[27] *De Ver.*, 22. 15.

PRINCIPLES OF ST. THOMAS'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE *ESSE* AND *RATIO* OF RELATION

PART II

THE *ESSE* AND *RATIO* OF ACCIDENTS

What has been said of *esse* and essence applies primarily to substance, which alone, says St. Thomas, properly possesses them.[1] However, the other predicaments also indicate being in some way: *Quot modis praedicatio fit, tot modis ens dicitur.* Since being is not a genus determined by differences extrinsic to it, it cannot be univocally predicated in these categories as animal is univocally predicated of man and dog.[2] They therefore signify being analogically according to their different reference to *esse.* Substance exists *per se;* that is, it is the proper possessor and subject of *esse.* Accidents do not have *esse* of themselves; they exist in and by the *esse* of substance. An accident, then, is not called being because it has *esse,* but because that to which it belongs has *esse;* its *esse* is *inesse;* it is *ens entis.*[3]

St. Thomas's parallel discussion of accidents and substantial forms highlights the dependence of accidents on substance. Neither accident nor substantial form exists by itself, but both in some way actuate the subject. However, the subject of substantial form — that is, matter — is purely potential and the form brings to it its primary being, *esse in actu.* But the subject of an accident — that is, existing substance — is already in the act of being; hence the accident only actuates some second potency giving the subject a second *esse, esse tale vel tantum,* not its act of existence. On the contrary the accident receives its act of existence from the subject; so, St. Thomas concludes, first substance is the cause of all accidents.[4]

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[1] *De Ente,* 2; *In XII Meta.,* 1. 2419; *Quodlibet. IX,* a. 3.

[2] *In V Meta.,* 9. 889 ff.

[3] *In IV Meta.,* 1. 534-43; *In XI Meta.,* 3. 2196; *De Pot,* 7. 7. On the double type of analogy in accidents with reference to being cf. Penido, *Le Rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris: Vrin, 1931), pp. 45-51.

[4] *Quodlibet. IX,* a. 3; *De Ente,* 7; *De Ver.,* 3. 7 ad 1; *De Pot.,* 7. 7 ad sed contra 5; *ST,* I, 77. 6. This second *esse* is not a second act of existing; that would make the accident into a substance joined to another. The accident is a new nature which participates in the act of existing of substance. But we predicate *esse* always through essences; and since the essence of substance does not include accidents we must predicate a second time, give a second *esse,* to indicate this accretion of being to substance.

He presents this causality of accidents in various ways according to the matter he is treating. But we can establish the following points.[5] First, as we have already indicated, substance is their quasi-material cause, the substratum *(sustentamentum)* in which accidents are "substantified." Secondly, it is the final cause of accidents, unlike the subject of substantial form which is for the sake of the form. Finally, the subject is the efficient cause of accidents, but in this we must distinguish among accidents for the subject is not the entire cause of all.

All accidents somehow derive from the essential principles of the subject, matter and form. Some are caused by these principles only partially, in aptitude; their full actuation requires an exterior agent as for instance, luminability in the air is actuated by the action of a lucid body. Since action implies receptivity and passion in the subject and the proper subject of passion is in the genus of material causality these accidents are said to follow on the matter, the principle of receptivity. And since matter is also the principle of individuation they are called individual accidents and are predicated *per accidens* of their subject. This "aptitude" is not merely the absence of any determination but a real capacity for certain determinations; not everything can become everything.

Other accidents, such as the powers of the soul, are caused in full act by the principles of the subject and inseparably accompany every individual of the species. They are called proper accidents or properties are predicated *per se* of the subject, and are said to follow on the form which is the principle determinant of the species. It should be noted that the causation of these proper accidents and the aptitude for the others is not real efficient causality, a making. St. Thomas calls it an *emanatio* or *resultatio;* that is, these accidents flow naturally and simultaneously from the actuation of the subject. Hence the real efficient cause is the agent which makes the subject.[6]

Another point, important in the consideration of relations, is St. Thomas's view of the mediation of accidents. Substance which alone possesses *esse* can be the only primary cause and subject of accidents in nature. But, he says, accidents come to or flow from substance in a certain order. In so far as one accident is already caused by and subjected in substance, it can be the mediator of other accidents both

[5] Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 17, 1. 2 ad 2; *In II Sent.*, d. 26, 1. 2 ad 2; *De Ente*, 7; *CG* IV, 14; *De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 3; *Quaestio de Anima*, a. 12 ad 7; *De Spirit. Creat.* a. 11; *De Ver.*, 3. 7; *De Pot.*, 10. 4; *ST*, I, 54. 3 ad 2; 77. 1 ad 5; 6 *in toto*

[6] This is indicated in *De Ver.*, 3. 7, when St. Thomas says that God has only one idea of the thing to be created including its proper accidents because it is not producible without them.

proximate cause and subject. Thus the intellect and will flow mediately from the substance of man, but they in turn are the imme-te principles and subjects of acts of knowing and willing and of ellectual and moral habits.[7] Thus also quantity, which St. Thomas s is the first accident of material substance and a coprinciple of ividuation, is the mediator of all other sensible accidents.[8]

These remarks show sufficiently that to look for the *esse* of accidents to look primarily for their causes in substance. To find their *ratio* must see how they have essence and how they are defined. For s we can do no better than to follow the argument of the *De Ente et sentia*[9] where St. Thomas treats the essence of accidents by comparison lh that of substance. His position can be reduced to three statements th the argument for each.

'The nature of accidents is not a complete essence and therefore y cannot be defined without bringing their subject into the definition." finition follows on the manner in which a thing has essence and this lows on the manner in which it has *esse*. Neither substantial nor idental forms can exist apart from their subjects; and since essence what can be, they are not complete essences and cannot be defined hout bringing in their subjects, which are necessary to their being; 1 cannot define these forms without telling that of which they are forms. This is definition by addition.

'An accident is not even a part of a single complete essence; there-e just as it is being only in a qualified sense *(secundum quid,* because s *ens entis)* so it has essence only in a qualified sense." A substantial m does not subsist by itself, but neither does its subject subsist without Hence their existential union yields that primary being by which substantial unit *(unum per se)* subsists by itself *(per se)*. Therefore is also the primary single essence which can be and be understood hout addition. But since the subject of an accident already has s primary being, the accident adds only a second *esse* and nature hout which the thing could be understood and defined. Hence the nposite of substance and accident is not an *ens* or *unum per se,* and ir natures do not constitute a single essence. The accident, then,

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He is very insistent on this and treats or applies it in many places. Cf. *In I t.*, d. 3, 4. 3 ad 2; *In III Sent.*, d. 33, 2. 4. sol. 3; *In IV Sent.*, d. 16, 3. 1. 1 ad 3; *De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 3; *Quaest. de An.*, a. 13 ad 8; *In IV Meta.*, 35; *ST*, I, 77. 1c, 7c and ad 2; I-II, 7. 1 ad 3; 50. 2 ad 2; 56. 1 ad 3.

In V Meta., 15. 983; *In Boet. de Trin.*, 4. 2; 5. 3.

7. The whole matter of the definition of substances and accidents, of defini-by addition, of the type of unity in accidental composites, is fully discussed *n VII Meta.*, 3, 4, and 5.

is not even part of a complete essence; and so the term *essence* applies to it only in an analogous sense.

"An accident may be defined by addition either as signified in the abstract or the concrete; but only in the abstract is it properly placed in a predicament as genus or species. In the concrete it is reduced to the genus of its subject." From the union of matter and form results a single nature (e.g., man) in the genus of substance, and the concrete names signifying such composites are properly used to signify the genus or species. But the parts of substance, matter and form, are placed in a predicament only by reduction to the genus of the composite. From the union of an accident with its subject there results no single essence to which genus or species could be applied (e.g., white man). Hence concrete names of accidents (*album,* the white) are in a predicament only by reduction to the genus of their subjects. But when signified in the abstract (*albedo,* whiteness) they can properly be placed in a predicament as genus or species, but differently from substance. In substance the genus is taken from the matter and the difference from the form. Since accidents are not composed of matter and form, the genus must be drawn from the mode of being as indicated by the predicament itself and the difference from the causative principles of the accident; the subject, then, becomes the difference. For instance, snubness is defined as curvature of the nose (curvature being a species of quality).

But if accidents are defined in the concrete, the subject (which is the receptive matter) becomes the genus, and the mode of being of the predicament becomes the difference; e.g., *snub* is defined as a curved nose. In either case, if one accident is the principle of another as action, passion, and quantity are of relation, the first can be brought into the definition of the other in place of the subject, for it functions as subject.[10]

This brings out both the distinction and the very close unity of substance and accident. In another place[11] St. Thomas says that in

[10] In its strictest sense, definition applies only to essence in its strictest sense—that is, to the substantial unit which can be *per se.* We have already said that *ratio* is wider than definition in this sense. Since, when the *ratio* is immediately founded on the thing, it signifies *what* is—that is, some determination of *esse*—every *ratio* can be called an essence or definition in a wider and analogous sense depending on the different reference of the *ratio* to *esse.* This applies to a *ratio* which is a single essence although expressed as a complex, e.g., rational animal or to an object which is complex in itself but expressed by one word, e.g., army or to an object which is complex in being and expression but seen as one, e.g., a little black dog running down the street with its tail between its legs. Cf. *In VII Meta.,* 3. 1325 ff.; 4. 1331 ff.

[11] *ST,* I-II, 53. 2 ad 3.

atever way an accident is signified its *ratio* includes a dependence its subject. In the abstract the reference begins from the accident . terminates in the subject so that the subject is not the principal t of the definition: whiteness is that *by which* something is white. the concrete the reference begins from the subject and terminates he accident so that the subject is a principal part of the definition: white is *that which* has whiteness. St. Thomas concludes that what ngs to the accident only from the part of the subject should not attributed to it in the abstract; e.g., *magis* and *minus* apply to *album*, to *albedo*. When we come to explicate the *ratio* of relation in the tract (the only way in which accidents are in the predicaments) we st remember that although the reference to a subject is there, nothing t belongs to it because of its existence in any particular subject type of subject can be placed in its *ratio*.

The *ratio* then is precisely that nature which the intellect conceives l to which it gives a name, whether it be signified in the abstract *manitas, relatio)* or in the concrete *(homo, ad aliquid)*. It is the ect of both the metaphysician and the logician. In those properties ich accrue to it precisely as a known object, such as universality l genus, it is the object of the logician. But in its concrete mode having *esse* by itself or in a subject, it is the object of the meta- sician and natural philosopher.

Before discussing the *ratio* of relation let us mark the significance certain points already brought up. Owing to the nature of human elligence, it must employ a plurality and composition of concepts in der to attain some understanding of the things that are. This plurality indicative of some multiplicity (potential, virtual, or actual) in the ngs from which these concepts are drawn; but they do not each icate a distinct physical form. And this marks the contrast between Thomas's view and the Platonic view shared by Gilbert.

St. Thomas accuses the Platonists first of paralleling every concept h a separate form and next of making substances out of these ms. By reifying the absolute nature and attributing to it that clusiveness which it has in the intellect, they identify its mode of being l its mode of being known, which leads to the identification of logic l metaphysics. Whether being, then, is one form or identical with all ms, the particular existent which shares in many becomes a mere lection of forms without an intrinsic unifying principle and without l causality, which is the source of order and communion.[12]

[2] Cf. *De Substantiis Separatis*, 1 and *passim; In VI Meta.*, 13, 1270 ff.; *ST*, 4. 1.

t. Thomas so often brings up the position of Plato and the *Platonici*, who very many, that it would be impossible to give all the references here. His

Such a system likewise excludes relation from reality. For it certainl cannot be merely a form enclosed in a subject; it somehow overlap two subjects and reveals some communication between them. Fo Gilbert this communication was purely in the mind, that is, in com parison. But St. Thomas's theory of the cause of accidents alread lays the foundation for the reality of relations. It is true that a accidents are caused either in aptitude or in full act by the essentia principles of the subject. But even those caused in full act have yet tendential potency to further perfection; that is, they are in activ potency to operation and this requires interaction of the subject wit an extrinsic object.[13] All the perfections of a thing do, then, in som way flow from its essential principles. Yet things are not monad whose whole development and history consists merely in some inne activity, or whose perfection is completely determined from the beginnin by their own essences. For their perfection, things depend on th concrete activity of other things just as substances in their being an becoming depend on others.[14]

The essence of a thing may be considered as its definable minimum of act and maximum of potentiality; the progressive actuation of tha potentiality through the mediation of its accidents brings things to tha proper perfection which is their maximum of act. Hence St. Thoma says that the good and perfection of things lies not only in that whic is absolutely enclosed in them but also in their order to other things and this order is relation. By their very tendency to perfection, thing must be linked together in a complexus of relations. After considerin

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own position in reference to them is perhaps best expressed in *In I Meta.*, 1 158: "Patet autem diligenter intuenti rationes Platonis, quod ex hoc in su positione erravit quia credidit, quod modus rei intellectae in suo esse est sicu modus intelligendi rem ipsam. Et ideo quia invenit intellectum nostrum dupliciter abstracta intelligere, uno modo sicut universalia intelligimus abstract a singularibus, alio modo sicut mathematica abstracta a sensibilibus, utriqu abstractioni intellectus posuit respondere abstractionem in essentiis rerum; und posuit et mathematica esse separata et species."

For good studies of St. Thomas's undertanding and critique of the Platoni ideas with excellent textual references cf. Victor Lipperheide, *Thomas von Aquin und die platonische Ideenlehre* (München, 1890); Anton Pegis, "St. Thomas an Plato: Cosmogony and Knowledge," *Thought*, XVIII (December, 1943), 643 f

[13] Cf. *ST*, I, 77. 3; *De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 1.

[14] This is another aspect of the adoption of Aristotle's *via media* betwee complete intrinsicism and complete extrinsicism which, in regard to the origi of forms, has been so well expressed by Gilson, *L'Esprit de la philosophi médiévale* (Paris: Vrin, 1932), I, 143 ff.; 271, n. 16.

Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 17, 1. 2 ad 1: ". . . accidens . . . extenditur extra suum subjectum sicut ad objectum operationis . . . extenditur ad objectum extrinsecum imprimens similitudinem formae suae in ipso . . . extenditur in aliud objectum extrinsecum, cujus similitudo in ipso recipitur . . ."

ratio of relation, I hope to show that the *esse* of relation lies primarily hat openness and tendency of beings to other beings; relations are windows of being which Leibniz could not find in his monads—ause they were mathematical functions without *esse*.[15]

THE *RATIO* OF RELATION

ince relation is a supreme genus it cannot be strictly defined; but e something is understood by the term, it has a *ratio* which can be ified by a descriptive definition. In the *Categories,* Aristotle had en two such descriptions. After giving several examples of relative ns — superior, double, habit, knowledge, great, etc. — he concludes:

> Those terms then are called relative the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition "of" or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation.[16]

t this definition gives rise to difficulties with regard to substance. r parts of substance, such as hand or head, "are defined with reference that of which the things indicated are a part; and so it comes about t these appear to have a relative character." So he proposes another inition:

> If however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found. The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative.[17]

The latter definition assumed, it is clear that if one knows a relative must also know the correlative; if he knows that something is uble, he must know that of which it is double; for "if there is thing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not ow at all that it is double." Now we can know the essential character such parts of substance as hand or head without knowing that to ich they are related, i.e., without knowing whose hand or head is ant. He concludes:

> It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised the questions with regard to details is not without advantage.[18]

A more exhaustive examination was undertaken by many commen-ors; but the translation and commentary of Boethius introduced the holastics to the *Categories* and set much of the terminology. Aristotle's

[15] Leibniz's position derives from his doctrine: *"Praedicatum inest subjecto,"* every judgment should ultimately be analytic, for the monad alone is the rce of all its variety and history; there is only "ideal" interaction and rela-ns between monads. Cf. *The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings,* ns. Robert Latta (London: Oxford University Press, 1898), pp. 32-70.

[16] *Categories* vii. 6a 36 ff.

[17] *Ibid.* 8a 12-35.

[18] *Ibid.* 8a 35 to 8b 24.

first definition is thus translated: "Ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur, qua cunque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum esse dicuntur, vel quomodolib ad aliud . . ." This, he says, is believed to be Plato's definition relation.[19] Boethius then discusses at length the grammar and pro erties of relations. Coming to the difficulty about substance, he translat Aristotle's second definition: ". . . sunt ad aliquid, quibus hoc ipsu esse, est ad aliquid quodammodo se habere . . ." Since, like Gilbe after him, Boethius identifies *esse* with form, he makes it clear that *es* means nature or substance — that is, the *ratio*. So he says that t *esse* of relatives is not merely that they are said to be referred, but th this reference is contained in its very nature. And this reference just that comparison or habitude to another in which the mind conside a thing. Since the whole *esse* of a relative derives from this extrins comparison, a thing without changing in itself may become relati through reference to another.[20]

Together with Gilbert's terminology of relations as *assistens* we ha here all the elements in St. Thomas's theory of the *ratio* of relatio He does not mention the two definitions, but they appear to be t foundation for his distinction between *relatio secundum dici* and *relat secundum esse*. Boethius tried to solve Aristotle's dilemma abo substance by holding that one nature could be in two predicaments once.[21] St. Thomas does not admit this. He says that certain ter signify a *ratio,* quiddity, essence, which itself is not in the predicame of relation but which may be explained or understood relatively (*he* would be described as a certain *part of* a body although it is substance or a real relation may be implied or follow from it (knowledge, creatures, is a quality on which follows a real relation to the thi known). These are called relatives *secundum dici.* Other terms signi a thing precisely as relative, and the relation implied here is in t predicament of relation; such are master, servant, father, son. The are relations *secundum esse.*[22]

[19] *In II Categoriarum Aristotelis* (*PL,* LXIV, 216d-217c); cf. St. Albe *Lib. de Praed.,* III, 3 (Borgnet, I, 227). The ascription of this definition Plato seems to have been traditional, although St. Thomas never mentions It could be drawn from several places in Plato; for instance, cf. *Charmid* 167 ff.; *Theaetetus* 152-56; *Parmenides* 132-33.

[20] *In II Cat. Arist.,* (*PL,* LXIV, 223c, 235a-236b). However, that he agre with his commentator Gilbert can be seen from the *De Trinitate,* (*PL,* LXI 1254a-b): "Quae tota (praedicatio relativa) non in eo quod est esse consist sed in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere . . ."

[21] *In Cat. Arist.* (col. 220d-221a, 250a, 261bc).

[22] *In I Sent.,* d. 30, 1. 2; *ST,* I, 13. 7 ad 1; *De Ver.,* 4. 5; 21. 6. St. Thom points out that relatives *secundum dici* and *secundum esse* are not parallel wi relations of reason and real relations. Some relations *secundum esse* are rel tions of reason, such as right and left in inanimate things; some relatio *secundum dici* imply real relations, such as that following on knowledg

St. Thomas also makes clear that when it is said that things are ative whose *esse* is *ad aliud,* and in the term relation *secundum esse,* e signifies neither the act of existing nor the verbal copula. It is, fact, a third sense in which he uses the term, and it signifies here at it was opposed to in the other meanings. Here it indicates the *io,* quiddity, or nature, as Boethius has said; and it derives from the minology of Aristotle *to ti en einai,* which is translated into Latin as *od quid erat esse.* Hence it is the *ratio,* not the existence of relation hich is *ad aliud.*[23]

Ad aliud, then, expresses the *ratio* of relation; and we ask just what is implies. The explanation of this *ratio* is the first part of his theory hich St. Thomas worked out, because it was occasioned by the problems the divine names and the Trinity. And there is no reason to suspect at he was merely juggling terms to fit the case. He warns against urting the derision of the infidels by trying to demonstrate the demonstrable or explain the inexplicable by weak or false philosophical inciples. He would not attempt to go further in reasoning than his inciples permitted and would be most careful in delineating the principles as they approached the intimacy and mystery of the divine life.

First St. Thomas points out that relation by its nature does not posit y reality in the subject of which it is predicated; its reality or unreality ust be determined in some other way than by the truth of its edication. In this he is comparing relation with what he calls the solute genera, that is, those which are entirely intrinsic to their bject and involve nothing outside it in their predication — what ajetan calls *absolutum a termino.*[24] These are the categories of subance, quantity, and quality; all the other categories involve something tside the subject.[25]

The point St. Thomas is making here is that a being of reason, a cond intention only mediately founded on things, can verify fully the *tio* of relation, whereas no being of reason can fulfill the *ratio* of the

hough knowledge is not in the predicament of relation. Cf. *In I Sent.,* d. 30, 1 ad 1; *In III Sent.,* d. 8, 1. 5 ad 2; *Quodlibet. IX,* a. 4 ad 3.

[23] *In I Sent.,* d. 33, 1. 1 ad 1; *In III Sent.,* d. 8 1. 5 ad 2; *Quodlibet. IX,* 4 ad 3.

[24] *In de Ente et Essentia,* ed. Laurent (Turin: Marietti, 1934), 22. The main cts dealing with this point and with the imperfection included in the other cidents are: *In I Sent.,* d. 8, 4. 3; d. 20, 1. 1; d. 26, 2. 1; *De Pot.,* 8. 2; *odlibet. I,* a. 2; *ST,* I, 28. 1 and 2.
In all of these the only accidents mentioned as absolute are quantity and quality. jetan accepts it as St. Thomas's intention to include only these, although he ves an alternative interpretation (*In I Summae Theologicae,* 28. 1).

[25] For the scheme of the categories, which will be discussed later cf. *In III ys.,* 4; *In V Meta.,* 9. 891-92.

absolute genera.[26] Substance is not dealt with in the texts. He co sidered it clear that since substance is the unit existent in nature which *esse* properly belongs, no being of reason could be called substan except equivocally, since it can have *esse* only in the intellect. The oth way in which we can signify a reality is as having *esse in alio,* that as an accident whose *ratio* is the capacity to be in, *inesse.* Thus also includes in its *ratio* that aptitude for existing in nature which being of reason can fulfill.[27]

Now, St. Thomas says, the absolute accidents by the proper *ratio* their own genus signify in the manner of an accident; that is, th signify something in something. They, therefore, by their very natu posit a reality and so no being of reason can fulfill their nature. B relation by its *ratio* does not signify something but *to* something (*n aliquid, sed ad aliquid*); and it does not signify being either *in se* *in alio* but simply *ad aliud.* Certainly its *ratio* does not exclude t signification of a reality — then there would be no real relations.[28] Re and nonreal are simply notes which are outside its *ratio* and must determined by another means, namely, by discovering whether or not has a cause in the subject to which it is attributed.

Furthermore, with the exclusion of that *inesse* which belongs to t *ratio* of accident, there is excluded also the imperfection of dependen on, and composition with, substance which characterizes accident Hence even if the note of reality is added to relation, it would still n follow that it was an accident; its *ratio* does not exclude its identificati with substance in its *esse.*[29] This means that the *ratio* of relati

[26] *In I Sent.,* d. 20, 1. 1; d. 26, 2. 1; *De Ver.,* 1. 5 ad 16; *De Pot.,* 1. 1 10. John of St. Thomas has a good treatment of this point: *Cursus Phi sophicus, Ars Logica,* II, 17. 2 (ed. Reiser [Marietti, 1930], I, 581b).

[27] *Esse,* the act of existing, is not included directly in the essence or *ra* of any genus or of any created being. Substance is *cui debetur esse in se* a accident is *cui debetur esse in alio;* it is a definition by addition, the princi part being the *capacity for esse.* Cf. *In I sent.,* d. 8, 4. 2 ad 2; *Quodlibet. IX,* 5 ad 2.

Hence St. Thomas says in the beginning of the *De Ente* that essence deri from the first meaning of being, what has *esse in natura rerum.* Beings reason do not properly have essences; yet they have a *ratio,* an intelligibili which the intellect itself gives to them when it gives them *esse* in the intelle Cf. *supra,* nn. 30 and 59.

[28] *Quodlibet. IX,* a. 4.

[29] This doctrine both with regard to relation and the other accidents appl only to the *ratio* of the genus itself. It may be that some species of relation the *ratio* of that species implies both a reality and an accident. Cf. Caje *In I Summae Theologicae,* 28. 1. We have also remarked that some species quality, e.g., wisdom, do not imply the imperfection which the *ratio* of the ge does. However St. Thomas says that a mode of predication is drawn only fr the genus; hence there are only two modes of predication *in divinis,* that substance and of relation; species of quality, like wisdom, are predicated in

anscends the category of relation as an accident, and that it can erefore be analogously predicated.

The *ratio* of relation also includes some positive notes. First, it mands two distinct terms, for it is predicated about a subject with ference to another (*ad aliud*) which is the correlative. If the relation one of reason, the terms are distinct only in concept, not in *esse,* as the relation of identity. If the relation is real in one term and ot in the other, the other must at least be conceived as relative. Hence relation cannot be abstracted from its correlative, since the latter nters into its very nature.[30]

Aristotle had held this when he said that if you know one relative ou know the correlative in those things which are relative *secundum sse*. Relative and correlative, then, must be simultaneous in time, being, nd cognition. This, of course, applies only to relatives in act, not in otency; the subjects of the relations may exist and be known under me other aspect before they are related or known to be related. The nowable may exist before there is knowledge of it; the man who is ather existed before his son; a cause may exist before its effect. But a ing is only known and designated under that relation (*scibile secundum ctum*) when there is knowledge of it; a man cannot be or be known s father or son unless he has and is known to have a son or a father; he actual relations of cause and effect are and are known only when hat which is the cause is producing or has produced the effect.[31]

Secondly, since the distinction made by relation is formal rather than uantitative and numerical, it implies opposition of the terms. Since he opposition of contradiction signified by affirmation and negation is rimary and the others merely determinations of it, it must be found omehow in all of them. But whereas the opposition of habit and priva- ion and of contraries lies in affirmation and negation within the same ubject, the proper opposition of relation is not within the subject but n reference to the distinct correlative. And here contradiction is verified, or what can be affirmed of father as father can be denied of son as on.[32]

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ode of substance. Besides the texts already referred to cf. *ST,* I, 28. 2 ad 1; *I Sent.,* d. 22, exp. text.; d. 33, 1. 1 ad 5.

[30] *In Boet. de Trin.,* 5. 3, "Quando ergo . . . "; *De Pot.,* 1. 1 ad 10; 7. 10 ad 3; *V Meta.,* 11. 912; *ST,* I, 40. 2 ad 4.

[31] *In I Sent.,* d. 9, 2. 1; d. 12, 1. 1 ad 1; *De Pot.,* 7. 8 ad 1; *In X Meta.,* 8. 087-94; *ST,* I, 13. 7 ad 6; 42. 3 ad 2.

[32] *In I Sent.,* d. 5, 1. 1 ad 1; d. 26, 2. 2; *In IV Sent.,* d. 8, 1. 2 sol. 1 ad 1; *e Pot.,* 2. 1 ad 13; 8. 1 ad 13; *In I Meta.,* 12. 922; *In X Meta.,* 6 *in toto; T,* I, 33. 4 ad 3. St. Thomas points out that affirmation and negation can also e verified within the same subject. A man may be both father and son but ot with reference to the same correlative; hence what is affirmed of him as

But relative opposition differs from the other in two ways. First, the others one opposite removes the other: negation removes affirm tion; privation removes habit; one contrary removes the other in t same subject. But because relative opposition is in reference to distinct term, it rather supposes and posits its opposite; father posi son and creator posits the creature. Secondly, in the other oppositio one term is perfect and the other imperfect. But in relation there implied no imperfection in either term; they may both be perfect in the being, as father and son or equals.[33]

An application of these properties of relation which will bring o their significance is found in St. Thomas's treatment of a most delica problem regarding the Trinity. The problem is stated in two objectio brought forward in an article where he asks whether or not the relatio in God are really distinct from one another.[34] First: things that are t same with a third thing are the same with one another; but eve relation existing in God is in fact (*in re*) identified with the divi essence; therefore they are not really distinct from one another. Secon just as paternity and filiation are distinguished from the divine essen only by the *ratio* which their names signify, so are power and goodnes but this distinction of the *ratio* does not make a real distinction betwe the divine goodness and the divine power; therefore neither does t distinction in the *ratio* of paternity and filiation make them really distin

To the first objection St. Thomas answers that the argument hol when two things are the same with a third in fact and in their *ratio, et ratione, sicut tunica et indumentum,* but not where they differ *ratio* Then he draws a comparison from Aristotle's treatment of motion in t *Physics*.[35] Action and passion are identified with motion, but it do not follow that action and passion are the same. For in action there implied that respect of motion as *from* the agent, and in passion t respect of motion as *in* the patient from another. Likewise paternity a filiation are the same *secundum rem* with the divine essence, but in the proper *rationes* they imply opposite respects and so cannot be identifie and since these relations are real, they are also really distinct.

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father may be denied of him as son.

The distinction between formal and quantitative opposition is basic in t whole question of the one and the many. Cf. *In Boet. de Trin.*, 4. 1; *De Ve* 1. 1; *De Pot.*, 9. 5c and ad 8; 10. 4 and 5; *In IV Meta.*, 3. 566; *ST*, I, 11. and ad 1; 11. 2 ad 4; 30. 3 *in toto;* 36. 2.

[33] *De Pot.*, 7. 8 ad 4; 8. 1 ad 13. Again some species of relation, such master and servant, may involve inequality in the terms; but this follows fr the *ratio* of that species, not from the *ratio* of relation. Cf. *De Pot.*, 2. 4c.

[34] *ST*, I, 28. 3 objs. 1 and 2.

[35] *Physics* iii. 3. 202b 10-30; St. Thomas, *In III Phys.*, 4. This example its is significant and will be further studied later.

In answer to the second objection St. Thomas says that since power d goodness imply no opposition in their *rationes,* it cannot be inferred s he has just done with the relations) that their distinction *ratione* akes them really distinct. From the two answers, then, we may conude that things which are identical with a third *in re* but distinct from in their *ratio, may* be distinct from one another; they *are* distinct if eir *rationes* formally oppose one another.

St. Thomas always maintains that there is a twofold comparison inlved in these relations in God. The first is to their subject, the divine bstance. In this aspect they are in every way like the attributes: ey are distinct from the divine essence only *ratione;* yet they are real; at is, there is that in the divine essence which verifies the *ratio.* The cond comparison is to their correlatives, and it is by this that they ave a different mode of predication than substance and have the charcter of distinguishing. Since the *rationes* of wisdom and goodness and e other attributes do not contain that opposition to one another of ffirmation and negation, they can be in one subject and even be predicated of one another; as we can say that the white is triangular because he same supposit can be both white and triangular. But by its very ature relation opposes and distinguishes its terms so that they cannot e in the same supposit or be predicated of one another.[36]

Hence the divine Persons cannot be predicated of one another. And nce thing (*res*) in a transcendental term applying equally to absolutes nd relatives, they can be called three things in reference to their relative orms. But if *res* is taken as absolute they can be only one thing; ere is in the Trinity absolute identity, and real relative distinction.[37]

Relation, then, is the only opposition which distinguishes its terms nd yet allows an identity of opposites, that is, a distinction of relative orm with identity of absolute form. In fact it not only permits but emands such an identity; for we shall see that it is founded on a ommunication in some absolute form, which is a perfection of being. he Trinity is the only instance where there is identity of substance, r the relations there are founded on the integral communication of the ivine nature which is its *esse.* In creatures the same form cannot be umerically communicated, but it can be communicated in kind, unioically or analogically.

In connection with the theory of accidents we noted the interdependnce of things for their mutual perfection; and we said that the *esse* of

[36] *In I Sent.,* d. 2, 1. 3 sed contra and ad 4; 1. 5c and ad 3; *De Pot.,* 8. 1 ad 7; 2 ad 3, 4, 15, 16, 19; *CG,* IV, 24; *ST,* I, 30. 1 ad 2.

[37] *In I Sent.,* d. 2, 1. 5 ad 2; d. 25, 1. 4c and ad 2; *De Pot.,* 9. 4 and 5; *ST,* 36. 2c.

relation lies in that openness of things to other things for that perfectio We may indicate here what will be verified later, that it is the actu communication of these perfections which establishes that unity on whic is founded the full actuality of relations in their *esse* and is also th basis for another aspect of the *ratio* of relation which it owes to i mode of conception; that is, the two correlatives are conceived as a un and an absolute medium between the subject terms.

St. Thomas brings this out in answering the following objectio Relation is a medium between two extremes; but between two term there is only one *via media* although there may be a difference in co cept; for, Aristotle says, the way from Thebes to Athens is the same the way from Athens to Thebes; therefore it seems that the father referred to the son and son to father by one relation.[38] In conformit with his doctrine that an accident is individuated by its subject, S Thomas answers:

> . . . some have said, as Avicenna reports, that the same numerical relation is in both terms; this cannot be because one accident is not in two subjects. We must say, then, that there is in each extreme one relation differing from that in the other, sometimes in species, as in those where each has a different name as paternity and filiation; but in others they do not differ in species but only in number as when there is one name for both, as in similitude or equality. The relation, then, which is in one as a subject is in the other as a term, and *e converso*. And therefore relation by its *esse*, in so far as it has a foundation in the thing, is not a medium but an extreme; but according to the respect (*respectus*) it is a medium; hence it is evident that they are really distinct.[39]

His answer in the *Summa* is even more explicit and exact:

> . . . . The way from one term to another and *e converso* is the same; yet the respects are diverse. Whence it cannot be concluded that the relation of father to son and *e converso* are the same; *but this could be concluded of some absolute, if it were a medium between them.*[40]

Let us paraphrase these answers. The road from Thebes to Athens one absolute physical entity which stands between the two cities touc ing each. True, one does not travel it in the same direction from Theb to Athens and from Athens to Thebes; but that does not change the ro itself. Now if relation were an absolute entity like the road standi between and touching its terms, the mind could travel over it fro either term, as the eye can scan a line from right to left or left to righ but the relation would still be one medium with only a distinction reason. But relation in that which makes it real, its *esse* (here its a

[38] *In I Sent.*, d. 27, 1. 1 obj. 1; *ST*, I, 28. 4 sed contra. Cf. Aristotle *Ph* iii. 3. 202b 13; he uses this example to show how one actuality can belong two things. Cf. *supra*, n. 84.

[39] *In I Sent.*, d. 27, 1. 1 ad 2. For Avicenna cf. *Meta.*, III, 10 (F83rb). Thomas recognized that Avicenna did not hold the doctrine which he reports.

[40] *ST*, I, 28. 4 ad 5. (The italics are mine.)

existing, not its nature), is not a medium. In creatures it is an ccident which therefore has *esse* in its subject making a distinct rela- on in each term to the other.

Yet that reality of relation in each term is somehow open or tending the other term and this founds the *ratio, ad aliud,* of relation. Again is tendency is not a physical entity extending beyond the subject and aking it to the correlative like a road or a chain. But the intellect eing or anticipating the realization of that tendency in the union of e terms in some perfection, unites relative and correlative in one ncept as an absolute medium, *habitudo media,* differing only in the *spectus,* that is, whether you view it from term *A* to term *B* or vice rsa. Thus to grasp that unity of absolutes which is the actuation of e *esse* of two distinct relations, the intellect adds something of its own the concept of those relations.[41]

St. Thomas has another way of putting this. Quantity and quality gnify as something remaining in the subject; but relation signifies as transit to another, as *assistentes,* as a medium between terms. As ch, relations are neither accidents nor substances, but beings of rea- n.[42] And that is where the Porretani stopped. The absolute *ratio* as to them the whole; and since it could be neither an *ens in se* nor an *s in alio,* they correctly called it a being of reason. But if we prescind om that which the ratio of relation owes only to its mode of conception, at *ratio* with all its properties may have a real *esse* in things founded and caused by something inhering in the subject by which it is truly edicated as *ad aliquid.*[43] That is matter for another discussion.

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[41] This completion of the *ratio* of some reality by the addition of something the intellect is by no means unique in the philosophy of St. Thomas. This is ly a special case of what applies to all accidents; in the abstract they are nceived *per modum substantiae,* a mode in which they do not exist; it was e Platonic error to *judge* that they so exist. (Cf. *In I Meta.,* 9. 894; *In I Meta.,* 1. 1253; 4. 1353.) So things are true and time is real, but the *ratio* both is completed by the intellect. (Cf. *In I Sent.,* d. 19, 5. 1; 2. 1; *De Ver.,* 1; *In IV Phys.,* 23.) The *ratio* of motion conceived as a medium between o terms is likewise completed by the intellect. (Cf. *In III Phys.,* 4.)

[42] *De Pot.,* 7. 8; 8. 2. In two passages St. Thomas gives almost a picture of lation as a medium: ". . . inquantum est relatio vel ordo . . . solum [habet] od ad aliud sit quasi *in aliud transiens,* et quodammodo *rei relatae assistens*" *bid.,* 7. 9 ad 7).

"Si igitur consideremus . . . relationes secundum id quod relationes sunt, sic veniuntur esse *assistentes, non intrinsecus affixae;* quasi significantes respectum odammodo *contingentem rem relatam,* prout *ab ea tendit in alterum*" (*ST,* I, 2c).

[43] *In I Sent.,* d. 26, 2. 1; d. 33, 1. 1; *ST,* I, 28. 2c.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION[1]

PROFESSOR NORTHROP'S IDEA OF THOMISM

In recent years there has been a growing interest in Thomisti philosophy among non-Catholic and non-Thomistic thinkers. Hence numerous summaries and expositions of Thomism are now beginnin to appear in books and articles written by non-Thomists. Howeve Thomism is an extremely complex and profound philosophy; an consequently these expositions have frequently been inadequate an sometimes positively misleading. A case in point is the chapter "Roma Catholic Culture and Greek Science" in a recent widely publicized boo by Professor Northrop.[2] It is the purpose of the present note to poin out the generally erroneous character of Professor Northrop's analysi and to suggest reasons why an obviously sincere effort at expositio should end in failure.

Professor Northrop's general purpose in this book is "to resolv *in theory* within the calmness of study" (p. x) the conflicting ideologie which are now dividing the peoples of the world. He therefore rightl undertakes a preliminary analysis of the ideologies themselves. In th course of this analysis he turns his attention to the philosophical basi (which he takes to be Thomism) of Roman Catholic culture.

Now, unfortunately, Professor Northrop gives very few detaile references; however, he appends a bibliography, arranged by chapters in which one may find his main authorities. For the chapter in questio we find listed (pp. 503-4), relative to Thomism, one "original" source McKeon's *Selections from Mediaeval Philosophy,* three books by Jacque Maritain, three by Professor Gilson, one by Mortimer Adler, an articl in the *Thomist,* and several in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN. A few of the other books or articles listed might possibly be considere as bearing on Thomistic philosophy. In addition, Professor Northro mentions in the Introduction (p. xii) various scholars to whom he i indebted for help in the preparation of the book. No expert is men tioned for Thomism or Catholicism. In general, only the books whic Professor Northrop himself lists will here be used in pointing out th misunderstandings which appear in his chapter.

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[1] With this issue THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN opens a new departmen "Notes and Discussion." In this section will appear letters, questions, discussion and shorter notes. The readers of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN are invite to contribute to this philosophical open forum.

[2] F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West* (New York: Macmilla 1946), pp. 254-90. Permission to quote from Professor Northrop's book ha kindly been granted by The Macmillan Company, publisher.

Now the underlying assumptions of Professor Northrop's analysis these:

Aristotelian philosophy was intrinsically and essentially dependent n Aristotle's empirical natural science.

> Aristotle is able to arrive at the theological doctrine of the perfection of God's nature by means of nothing but scientific concepts and distinctions—scientific concepts moreover which were derived solely from natural science. In fact, there is not a solitary principle in the Aristotelian philosophy and theology which is not required by and does not appear in Aristotle's physics (p. 280).
>
> Thus in his [Aristotle's] metaphysics, which merely states in general terms, applying to all sciences and fields of knowledge, what his previous investigations in the specific sciences had demonstrated independently for each one . . . (p. 279).

The science and philosophy of St. Thomas are practically identical h the science and philosophy of Aristotle.[3] Thomistic theology and n the meaning of Revelation[4] for St. Thomas are merely an extension Aristotelianism. Thus the entire structure depends for its validity n the empirical science of Aristotle.

> Thus, what St. Thomas did was to take the conception of man and nature *precisely* [italics ours] in the form which Greek science, as made philosophically articulate by Aristotle, indicated it to possess, and to identify the traditional words of Christian doctrine such as "soul," "God," "perfection," "grace," and "revelation" with certain factors in this generally accepted and, for its time, scientifically verified theory (p. 279).
>
> The present orthodox doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church was formulated in the thirteenth century by St. Thomas Aquinas. Taking the scientific conception of the universe and of man which was accepted at that time as it had been formulated technically in the philosophy of Aristotle, St. Thomas identified the objects and doctrines of Christian religious belief with certain items and their hierarchic relations in this Aristotelian universe. To be sure, he also distinguished between the contribution of reason, which Aristotle's science provided and precisely expressed, and the contribution of divine revelation, of which the Church of Rome was the earthly custodian. But even revelation, as we shall see, gave the kind of religious knowledge with which Aristotle had identified the divine, merely presenting it more completely and fully than human reason alone could do (p. 261).
>
> Thus with St. Thomas, who studied under Albertus Magnus, the meaning of Roman Catholic Christian doctrine was shifted from the science and metaphysics of Plato to the science and metaphysics of Aristotle (p. 264).

Discoveries in logic, mathematics, physics, biology, and chemistry ce 1580 have conclusively and decisively disproven empirical Aris-

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It is this identification which enables Professor Northrop to substitute an osition of his interpretation of Aristotle for an exposition of Thomism.

Professor Northrop identifies "Roman Catholic Orthodoxy" with Thomism. vertheless, the Roman Catholic Church, using it [St. Thomas's theology] rously and without compromise, insisting in its orthodoxy on the *modification ot even a comma . . .* " *Op. cit.*, p. 286. (Italics ours.)

totelian science. The philosophy and theology of St. Thomas are th shown to be wholly inadequate and must be finally discarded.

> That the present Roman Catholic Aristotelian and Thomistic orthodoxy is as inadequate for the twentieth century as its original Platonic and Augustinian orthodoxy was inadequate in the thirteenth century A.D., has been proved conclusively by the investigations in mathematical physics of Galilei and Newton at the beginning of the modern world and by all the developments in modern physics, biology, mathematics, and mathematical logic since the time of Descartes and Newton. One cannot expect to find a philosophical solution for the inadequacies of the theories of modern philosophy by going back to the medieval Aristotelian and Thomistic science and philosophy, whose breakdown in the sixteenth century brought these modern philosophical theories into existence (p. 265).

> The latter conception rests up on a theory of nature and of man which was justified by empirical evidence and scientific method in the medieval period, but which has turned out since then in the face of additional, similarly determined empirical scientific evidence, to be false at certain points to an extent sufficient to invalidate its basic assumptions. Were nature and man what Aristotelian science claims, then certain facts and experimental findings discovered first by Galilei would not be what they are. It is scientific, not moral or religious considerations which force us to reject the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy and theology as the correct and adequate idea of the good to be taken as a model for solving the scientific, philosophical, and cultural problems of our time. But more concretely, as Galilei shows, were the Aristotelian science correct, projectiles should not move as they do, and Newton's rather than Aristotle's laws of motion should not be empirically valid (pp. 281-82).

4) However, Aristotle and St. Thomas have this merit that they sho us, in principle, how the structure of philosophy and theology should rebuilt on the basis of modern empirical science.

> As President Hutchins has clearly seen, Roman Catholic culture illustrates in terms of Greek and medieval materials, the manner in which the present disorganized and departmentalized portions of human knowledge might be related providing the implications of contemporary science for philosophy and the potentiality of such a scientifically grounded philosophy for theology were thoroughly pursued. It exemplifies how mathematical and natural science, as its facts are made theoretically systematic and articulate, gives rise to philosophy; and how this philosophy, when certain identities are made, gives technical meaning and—since it is scientifically determined—publicly valid empirical justification to the claims of Western religion and morality; and how these in turn and the science and philosophy from which they stem, when applied then generate the Western arts of poetry, painting, music, sculpture, architecture, and governmental and ecclesiastical polity in their normative character, as well as engineering and technocracy, thereby defining not merely the instruments by means of which ends can be achieved but also the good end itself. In short, Western philosophy, when pursued according to the method of its Greek founders, is natural science made articulate with respect to its basic assumptions on the theoretical side (p. 288).

5) That Thomistic theology and philosophy are built upon and depende

n empirical science is not only a fact but is actually admitted by man Catholics and Thomists.

> Thus St. Thomas and the Roman Catholics see very clearly that the traditional words of Christian doctrine are by themselves quite meaningless noises unless they are identified, or by the accepted methods of logic, connected with the specific content of scientific knowledge (pp. 278-79).

> Thus there is no justification whatever, even in the doctrine of revelation in Roman Catholicism, for the contemporary, erroneous supposition that the doctrines of the Christian religion and one's moral ideas of perfection can be validated independently of systematically developed philosophical theory that is grounded in the empirical content of our knowledge of man and nature, as this content is specified by the methods of natural science (p. 279).

n order to restrict the discussion entirely to Thomism and so avoid lixity, let us pass over the first point. Modern scholarship no longer tains the old textbook theory that the philosophy of St. Thomas is ntical with the philosophy of Aristotle. The results of this scholar- together with selected evidence might have been found in several he books on Professor Northrop's list. Already in his *La philosophie môyen age,* Professor Gilson concluded his treatment of St. Thomas s: ". . . St. Thomas solidly established that his philosophy derived n nothing but itself and that it constituted an original synthesis ducible in essence to any one of the systems of the past."[5] *The Spirit Mediaeval Philosophy* is largely an investigation into the originality Christian philosophers in general and of St. Thomas in particular. e upshot of the evidence is that St. Thomas, while depending upon stotle, radically transformed the latter's philosophy so that in meta- sics he is in a different world from that of Aristotle. A few tations may illustrate the general drift of the conclusions.

> In this sense St. Thomas himself, who speaks of God in the pure language of Aristotle, is nevertheless far enough from the thought of Aristotle.[6]

> Into Aristotle's eternal world, existing outside God and without God, the Christian philosopher introduces the distinction of essence and existence.[7]

erring to the argument for the first mover, the "most Aristotelian" ll the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God, Gilson wrote:

> Undoubtedly we have here the very cosmography of Aristotle, for as far as concerns its physical structure St. Thomas' world is indistinguish-

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'. . . saint Thomas établissait solidement que sa philosophie ne relevait que e même, et qu'elle constituait une synthèse originale, irreductible par essence n quelconque des systèmes du passé." *La Philosophie au môyen age* (Paris: ot, 1930), p. 193.

Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York: Scribner,), pp. 57-58. Permission to quote Mr. Gilson has kindly been granted by publisher.

bid., p. 68.

> able from the Greek; but beneath the physical analogy how profound is the metaphysical difference![8]
>
> . . . we must make up our minds to admit that the Thomist proof of God by efficient causality means something other than the Aristotelian.[9]
>
> . . . and clear also why we were able to say that even when the Christian philosophers cite the letter of Aristotle they move on a different plane.[10]
>
> . . . the Christian mental universe is distinguished from the Greek mental universe, by ever more and more profound structural differences.[11]

This new philosophy did not arise from the empirical natural scie which St. Thomas knew, nor did St. Thomas himself conceive it to intrinsically dependent upon such science. On the contrary, St. Thom while serenely confident and certain of his metaphysical principles a conclusions, displayed a cautious reserve towards the empirical scie of his day. The classical text will bear quotation:

> Reasoning is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as showing how the remaining effects are in harmony with an already posited principle; as in astronomy the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, since some other theory might explain them.[12]

Professor Northrop, however, writes down a Platonic interpretat of Aristotle as authentic Thomism apparently quite unaware of development of modern research which is contained in the very bo to which he refers.

Professor Northrop further assumes and indeed asserts that Ron Catholics and Thomists understand that philosophy, including me physics and theology, are intrinsically dependent upon empirical natu science. The very opposite is the truth, and this again is contai explicitly in Professor Northrop's authorities.

Professor Gilson in his *Unity of Philosophical Experience* maint that modern philosophies are bankrupt not because they were ba on a *passing* natural science but because they misunderstood the nat

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

[12] *ST*, I, 32. 1 ad 2; the translation is that of Anton Pegis, *The B Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House, 1945), I, "Alio modo inducitur ratio, non quae sufficienter probet radicem, sed radici iam positae ostendat congruere consequentes effectus; sicut in astrol ponitur ratio excentricorum et epicyclorum ex hoc quod, hac positione f possunt salvari apparentia sensibilia circa motus caelestes; non tamen haec est sufficienter probans, quia etiam forte alia positione facta sa possent" (Ottawa, I, 210a). Permission to quote Mr. Pegis has kindly granted by the publisher.

hilosophy, not recognizing its proper principles and its independence he natural sciences. Consequently, the hierarchy of the sciences and r interrelations as set up by Professor Gilson are exactly opposite those Professor Northrop finds in Thomism.[13]

Thomists base the essential independence of philosophy on the doctrine he three degrees of abstraction, a doctrine which is the one Thomistic ory pertinent to Professor Northrop's thesis but which he never ntions. However, its exposition occupies a large part of the gisterial work of Jacques Maritain's *The Degrees of Knowledge* hich Professor Northrop lists). Though the point at issue is parlarly the theme of Part I, Chapter I, one quotation will suffice show the profound opposition to the doctrine which Professor rthrop attributes to Thomists.

> Superior, therefore independent, at least by its own formal constitution, philosophy is, as such, independent with regard to the sciences . . . . There is, most certainly, a strong *material* dependence of philosophy on the sciences . . . . But such dependence remains material, and the changes which it induces primarily affect the nature of the imagery whose importance is so great in his vocabulary, and the halo of associations which have gathered about the actual didactic terms: *to imagine that philosophical doctrines need to be radically transformed to fit in with scientific revolutions is as absurd* . . . .[14] (Italics ours.)

The only direct argument for his position which Professor Northrop ngs from a Thomistic source is the following:

> It is the reason also why in *Education at the Crossroads* the contemporary neo-Thomist Jacques Maritain, in his outline of an ideal university curriculum, specifies that the course in the philosophy of natural science must come ahead of the course in moral philosophy and theology. Without a scientifically grounded natural philosophy provided first, the basis and validation of humanistic values which may be said to be confirmed for everybody will not be at hand, and humanistic sophistry and ethical revelativism will not be avoided (p. 281).

Jacques Maritain does indeed advocate this order of teaching, but e reason lies not in any formal dependence of humanistic values or ral philosophy on natural science but in the order of development the human mind and in the *material* service which natural science

[13] Etienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: ribner, 1937), pp. 299-320, especially p. 319. Cf. *The Meeting of East and st*, p. 288.

[14] Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge* (New York: Scribner, 8), p. 63. Cf. also pp. 213-14, 66, 71-73, 75. Professor Northrop seems to ume that when St. Thomas or a Thomist says that all our knowledge preposes sense experience he is saying that all our knowledge presupposes pirical knowledge "specified by the methods of natural science." This of rse is not true.

renders to philosophical thought.[15] Moreover, in the first pages *Education at the Crossroads*,[16] Professor Northrop would have aga found an explicit application of the theory of the essential independen of philosophy.

Modern scholarship therefore does not allow it to be assumed th the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas and of Aristotle are esse tially the same; modern Thomists do not hold that the metaphysi of St. Thomas is or ever was intrinsically dependent upon empiri natural science. Projectiles may follow Aristotelian, or modern, yet-to-be-discovered laws, yet the principles of metaphysics are n thereby modified one whit. Of this Professor Northrop makes mention whatever and appears to be quite unaware, though it explicitly maintained and argued for in the books in his own bibliograph

Furthermore, after assuming the identity of Aristotelian and Thomis philosophy and thereby substituting an exposition of Aristotle for th of St. Thomas, Professor Northrop adds the specifically "theologica elements of Thomism from a thirty-one page article in the *Thomist* This article he calls a "very precise and concise exposition of S Thomas's theology" (p. 278), though it was never intended to be mo than a brief exposition of certain theological doctrines relative to t problem of peace. This is indicated in its title "The Theologi Ingredients of Peace" and is stated in the opening pages. Thus witho benefit of expert advice, with no discoverable reference to origin sources, with express use of only a short magazine article that is n exactly to the point, Professor Northrop undertook to analyze t theology of St. Thomas, of which he says himself: "Yet Einstein's theo of relativity is simple in comparison with the abstractness, the tec nicalities, the distinctions, and the ramifications of the theology St. Thomas" (p. 286).

The reason for Professor Northrop's mistakes seems now to be qu clear. Consequently, it is not surprising that the exposition is not or inadequate and mistaken in its larger lines but is also positively erroneo in detail. For example:

> This becomes even more evident when one examines the Aristotelian and Thomistic conception of God and perfection in more detail. The all-embracing first and final, formal cause, the rational principle of the

[15] "There is most certainly, a strong *material* dependence of philosophy the sciences. To begin with, philosophy is like the culminating point of hierarchy of knowledge, and as a result comes pedagogically last, etc." *Op. c* p. 63. Cf. the previous quotation which, in Maritain's text, follows this paragra

[16] Jacques Maritain, *Education at the Crossroads* (New Haven: Yale Un Press, 1943), pp. 4-9.

[17] J. C. Osbourn, O.P., "The Theological Ingredients of Peace," *Thomist,* (January, 1943), 23-54.

universe, is called "the Unmoved Mover" because it produces its effect by merely being itself without itself moving. Just as the living organism comes into mature being because it is guided by its final cause, as its aim and pattern, so the universe is created out of otherwise undifferentiated prime matter because reality, composed of both prime matter and the rational principle, which is the Unmoved Mover, is so attracted by the latter principle as its aim and goal that the ideal form of the Unmoved Mover becomes gradually and approximately but never completely actualized in the matter (p. 279).

Thomistic philosophy, creation is not an eduction of forms from me matter, nor does the Unmoved Mover combine with prime matter, r is creation caused by the attraction which the Unmoved Mover ercises on reality or on prime matter. Indeed it was just this sort Platonizing Aristotelianism that St. Thomas most vigorously opposed. gain:

> As will be shown later, in the Aristotelian and Thomistic science, philosophy, and theology, the soul of man is identified with the rational form of the living body, and God is identified with the rational form of the universe. Once the logical character of the Aristotelian forms as immortal universals is admitted then the eternity of God's being and the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul follow by definition. All that happens in human death is that the soul of the individual passes from the status of positive form to that of form by privation. Only its material particularity, not its formal individuality, dies (p. 270).

authentic Thomism the immortality of the soul and the eternity of od's being certainly do not follow *by definition* from *this* premise.

In short, if revealing terms like "St. Thomas," "Thomism," "Catholic rthodoxy" and so forth were omitted from the chapter, probably no nomist would ever guess that it was intended to be an exposition of omistic philosophy and Catholic Orthodoxy.

Finally, to summarize the point of this note: Thomism is a highly ginal, complex, and profound philosophy. It is difficult to learn th in itself and especially from its medieval sources. Any analysis Thomism therefore necessarily presupposes careful investigation and udy; otherwise, amazing mistakes will be unavoidable. A journalist, leed, may write as he runs, but a scholar, surely, is expected to main-n the integrity and solidity of his scholarship even when explaining ngs Catholic and Thomistic.

Robert J. Henle, S.J.

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Pere Pedro Descoqs, S.J., R. I. P.

Père Pedro Descoqs, S.J., died at Vals, near Lyons, November 1946. Having survived two world wars and the many vicissitudes the Society in France, he succumbed at last to the ravages of typhoi A short notice such as this cannot do justice to his memory and intended only as an expression of regret at his passing. For so vigoro a mind, his career was truly cut short in his seventieth year. At lea another decade of active life could have been his.

He was long the custodian and guiding spirit in building up t excellent library at the scholasticate on the Isle of Jersey, whither t Jesuits fled from the persecutions in France. But even more than t library his expository and controversial works on philosophy will rema as a monument to the man, and his students will long remember h dauntless spirit in his tilts with his opponents. Intense lover of Franc he yet recognized scholarship wherever found, and with a like schola ship declared the truth as he saw it. Besides his monographs a controversial articles, he was the author of: *Essai critique sur l'hyl morphisme; Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis; Praelectiones The logiae Naturalis.*

J. A. McWilliams, S.J.

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BOOK REVIEW

EDICAL ETHICS FOR NURSES. By Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A., Ph.D. Foreword by Fulton J. Sheen, Ph.D., D.D. Davis, Philadelphia, 1946. Pp. xiii + 356. $3.00.

This is a book for which we have waited. It is a good book. The thor deals with the real problems which nurses encounter. He gives ny "industries" for helping the teacher and the student — cases, bliography. His treatment is adequate, sometimes a little prolix.

The problems of nurses are not quite the same as those of doctors medicine. But the Catholic nurse needs to be pretty well informed all the possibilities she may face when engaged in her profession; d so the amount of medical lore which Father McFadden introduces n be really helpful, providing it is understood to be suggestive rather an definitive, informative in general rather than settling controversies offering actual diagnoses.

It is wise treating ethics for nurses as a subject which admits the ght of Revelation as well as the colder illumination of sheer and naided reason. The whole person, the nurse, meets problems that e whole, too; and no problem is dissociated from the eternal values. is well done, then, when Father McFadden instructs the nurse on e sacraments for the sick and in general when he introduces the ecifically Catholic considerations which the field acknowledges.

The chapter-heads indicate the contents quite well. The author gins with the nature and value of ethics and the foundations of orality. He goes on to Christian marriage — and wisely, because so uch of the moral field practically touches on, even though it does not rectly enter, the area where marriage complicates or enriches human fe. The author treats of contraception and of rhythm. He prudently ces the problem of pain. He gives clear teachings on abortion in all s phases, including a sane chapter on the ectopic. Baptism, whether utine or for difficult cases, is explained. Sterilization is judged and e complications that are to be met in this matter are proposed and the swers given. The great problem of co-operation in immoral or doubtlly moral operations is handled. Truthfulness and the professional cret are explained.

We think it is to be regretted that the author does not inclu treatment of the problems created for the Catholic nurse by the fa of social case work. Hospitals have their clinics, and social case worke have a definite mind to take over vast areas of human problems; a the nurse comes into contact with the patient who has been counsel by the social case worker and with the case worker herself. T devastating effect of the philosophy of life professed by so many these social case workers and the bad effect produced by their consiste and corrosive anticlericalism may surprise and certainly make take unpr pared the Catholic nurse who finds herself implicated in the progra devised for patients by these persons. A whole chapter would n be too much to give to this matter, especially as the activity a the influence of the social case workers is growing at a pace rea amazing. The philosophy of life which a Catholic must profess nee to be actually clear-cut and positive. One *thinks and feels and wi and acts as a Catholic,* says Pius XI. It would not be amiss for book for Catholic nurses to give more orientation in the basic philosop of life of a Catholic, whether nurse or patient; and it would be ve wise for such a book to advert to and pointedly prepare the Catho nurse for the onset of the alien philosophy of life so often profess by the professional medical social case worker.

There can be some dissatisfaction felt, too, over the treatment giv by the author to the problem of the nurse "co-operating" in immo and forbidden operations. The single cases treated are backed up authorities and the solutions for the single cases are good, even if t preparatory matter has not quite prepared the mind for appreciati the answer fully. However, there remains one stubborn fact not de with. It is the fact that single cases do not constitute the whole proble for the nurse who is employed in the non-Catholic hospital or in t ostensibly Catholic hospital under what is actually non-Catholic contr It is the fact in practice that the nurse might conceivably and und splendid safeguards of grace and plenteous knowledge of Catholic teac ing do once what she could not do habitually. The mental atmosphe the fact that repetition breeds familiarity and in the complicated proble of unethical and immoral operations may weaken principle — these ne to be stressed more than the author does stress them. It can be qu easy to come to think that therapeutic measures are ethical becau they short-cut difficulties and make for easier living, if not for mo living. An abortion or a sterilization may appear to have highly desira consequences. It takes sturdiness of mind and a clear hold on princip to realize that the end does not justify the use of evil means, when o is often exposed to the practical fact that an abortion or a sterilizati

inates difficulties. We think that an insistence that cannot be ed ought to be added to the treatment on co-operation so that it clearly and unequivocally known that no one can long assist at wrong type of operation without surely suffering in faith and in ciple.

We think, too, that the author is unduly forthright in his utter llemnation of artificial insemination. The article, appearing in *welle revue théologique* by Father Hurth (*La fécondation artificielle,* llet-Aout, 1946, p. 402) shows that the matter is not definitively settled that it admits of shades of meaning and, perhaps, of qualifications practice. Again, we think the author is too dogmatic in his state- nt of when Extreme Unction *cannot* be given. There is a growing ctice to give Extreme Unction much more liberally than the run he textbooks would seem to allow. Finally, there is one verbal slur should like to see changed. On page 6 in the paragraph wholly in ics the author uses the word *rationally* in such a context that one ght be inclined to think he felt that God's revealed truth was not ional. Anything that has any tendency to cater to a false appreci- on of the wisdom of God's revealed law, no matter how captious the erpretation, ought to be most carefully checked.

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BOOK NOTICES

THE TRINITY AND THE UNICITY OF THE INTELLECT. By St. Thoma Aquinas. Translated by Sister Rose Emmanuella Brennan S.H.N. Herder, St. Louis, 1946. Pp. 289. $3.00.

This book contains English versions of two short works of S Thomas: the treatise *In Boetii de Trinitate,* and the *De Unitate Inte lectus contra Averroistas.* By her previously published study of th intellectual virtues in the philosophy of St. Thomas, Sister Ros Emmanuella was well prepared to make an intelligent translation these works. Beyond brief introductions, no attempt at annotation ha been made.

St. Thomas's *Questions* on Boethius's *De Trinitate* offer much info mation about the interrelations of the sciences. A comparative tab of contents of the treatises on the Trinity by St. Augustine, Boethiu and St. Thomas is printed in Sister Rose Emmanuella's Prefac Students of theology and of philosophy alike will be interested in th development of precision in Trinitarian speculation and in the close associated philosophical notions of substance, person, and nature.

Latin Averroism is an important factor in thirteenth-century philo ophy. St. Thomas's opposition to this school is well outlined in th opusculum *De Unitate Intellectus.* It is, moreover, a useful source fo the study of the philosophy of the soul and theory of knowledg English Thomistic literature has been considerably enriched by the translations. Parts of them will make good collateral reading fo courses in metaphysics and the philosophy of man.

VERNON J. BOURKE

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THE FORMAL DISTINCTION OF DUNS SCOTUS. By Maurice Grajewski, O.F.M. Catholic University Press, Washingto 1944. Pp. xv + 211. $2.25.

That the Franciscan schools in the later Middle Ages were cente of important philosophical and theological movements is well knov to all medievalists. Much of the doctrine and history even of t major figures in these schools remains an unworked field of researc Modern Franciscan scholars are doing a good deal to remedy th

tion. The Quaracchi group is devoted to the publication of al editions of the important authors. Non-Franciscan scholars, as Little, Ehrle, Grabmann, and Sharp, have done some pioneer . It appears that a new generation of young Franciscan investi-s may carry on this work in America.

ther Grajewski's present doctoral disseration is well conceived and ited. Without being carried away by the spirit of controversy, ituates his author and subject in relation to the general current cholastic thought. That Duns Scotus used a special terminology, times faced problems in a new way, and arrived consequently at answers is stated objectively. The methodological problem of the s of distinctions is related to its historical and doctrinal context. author shows a scholar's acquaintance with matters of textual ism, bibliography, chronological sequence, and metaphysical impli-n. The formal distinction is well explained.

his study is, in fact, one of the few pieces of work in English which d be given to a student as an introduction to historical Scotism. e publications of this caliber will be welcome. It is to be hoped Father Grajewski will be enabled to carry on his investigation of ism, perhaps to write a complete introduction to the metaphysics lessed Duns Scotus.

VERNON J. BOURKE

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STOTLE, PLOTINUS AND ST. THOMAS. By A. H. Armstrong, M.A., (Aquinas Paper No. 4). Blackfriars, Oxford, 1946. Pp. 11. Sixpence.

his is a short and interesting paper in which the influence of Plotinus he Thomistic explanation of evil, of the soul, and of the nature of is sympathetically stressed. The conclusion seems to be that St. mas's Aristotelianism induced innovations indeed but that these e merely "variations within a great common tradition which derives he one side from the Bible and the teaching of the Church and on other from Plotinus" (p. 11). There is undoubtedly much truth is view, yet it must never be forgotten that St. Thomas, by applying uly existential metaphysics to being and knowledge, rejected prin-s which are fundamental to any Platonism. His conclusions, ever much they may appear to agree with those of Plotinus or to clothed in borrowed terms, are therefore, *philosophically* quite rent.

R. J. HENLE, S.J.

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THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF HUGH OF ST. VICTOR. By J
P. Kleinz. Catholic University Press, Washington, 19
Pp. xvi + 148.

An excellent summary, with careful documentation and bibliograp
of certain points of Hugh of St. Victor's doctrine about knowledg
given in this thesis. The discussion begins with a consideration of
sources of knowledge: reason, faith, authority, and mystical experie
This consideration serves mainly to plot Hugh's general orientation
to show his relation to the movements of the Middle Ages. A b
section on the subject of knowledge presents his psychology.
remaining parts of the thesis are concerned primarily with the obj
of knowledge: the world of sense, universals, reason and intellige
self-knowledge and certitude, and the ascent to God. The Victorin
thus seen to have been interested in all forms of knowledge, but i
equally evident that he did not attach the same importance to
Indeed, the problem of universals is hardly noticed by him. On
other hand, the problems of wisdom, of self-knowledge, and of
knowledge of God are favorite themes.

Father Kleinz states several times that the doctrine of knowledg
Hugh St. Victor is mainly a religious and moral one. Many rea
will wish that something of Hugh's treatment of this aspect had b
included. Perhaps if the texts had been studied from the viewp
of the religious and moral organization of knowledge, a better, m
satisfactory picture would have resulted.

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MAN AND SOCIETY IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Ernest F. Sc
D.D. Scribner, New York, 1946. Pp. viii + 299. $2.

The author, a Protestant clergyman actively functioning as a mini
for some considerable time and still very active as a teacher —
at Queen's University in Kingston, Canada, and then at Union T
logical Seminary in New York — brings his hopes and his learn
to a compact expression in this book.

He is concerned because he sees in the modern world the moven
away from men and toward institutions, with the grievous loss the
of the sense and meaning of individuality and personality. And he f
in the New Testament the supreme message that the individual is p
mount. He attempts, therefore, to set out his views of the teach
of the New Testament so as to correct, in those who will hear
this alarming tendency away from personality. The moral princi

e New Testament alone are able to support men in this life on ; the individual comes first: "The Kingdom of God is within." n this great truth is understood and accepted, then the New ament can be viewed in its true light.

. Scott is earnest, scholarly, zealous, and yet temperate. But he esents the position of orthodox Protestants, clinging stubbornly to Protestant concept of a church without visible authority; and at same time he *advances* by eliminating orthodox Protestantism's in the divinity of Jesus Christ. The result is a strange — almost alyptic — forecast of woe, because, exalting the individual and insist-n the supreme position in the scheme of things of the personality an, he knows no way of evading the anarchy that his position really ys him into envisioning as the best that can be hoped for on earth. sus founded no church, but he hoped his organized apostles would e as a model for churches. "He did not institute the church in any al manner," says Dr. Scott, "but it grew up, of its own accord, as necessary expression of his message. He had proclaimed the gdom of God and the Church was the community of those who pted the Kingdom" (page 129). And again "Whatever it [the rch] may do to apply the demands of the gospel in a concrete manner he urgent needs of our time, it must first make sure that men's s are in harmony with the mind of Christ" (193). Thus Dr. Scott ocates the message of Christ and invites men to put on the mind Christ. However, he strips Christ of his uniqueness and really ents only another Socrates or Buddha, of somewhat different stripe character, it is true, but still human and only human, and still essed only of insight and without the seal of revelation and miracle ack up with divine authority the insistences he made.

ounded on such bases, Dr. Scott's interpretation of the New Testa-t's meaning and program is lacking in the one thing that might it strength — authority. Maybe Seneca would relish the book. be the Stoics would find it good. But a Christian — in the sense ne who believes in the divinity of Jesus Christ — will find little e in the book than suggestions and confusing ideas.

BAKEWELL MORRISON, S.J.

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ERO IN THE COURTROOM OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. THE AQUINAS LECTURE, 1945. By E. K. Rand. Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1946. Pp. 115. $1.50.

eviewer and reader of this latest published Aquinas Lecture may per their reactions somewhat if they keep in mind the author's

purpose and the scope of his work. Professor Rand's purpose discover what respect St. Thomas had for Cicero. He indicates limitations of his study when he confesses its perils, arising ". . . p from my ignorance of the *Summa Theologica* in its whole extent, p because I purposely neglected to examine, whether anew or af what the authorities of our day have said about St. Thomas. wishing to discover how uninformed I was and having a high re for concordances, I wanted to see how much a concordance would t me . . . " (p. 3).

Following his list of references to Cicero in the *Summa Theolo* the author dips into the text at each prescribed point, comm enthusiastically and at times perhaps naively on what he sees Thomas doing, and takes occasions for digressions on memory, rhetc training, St. Thomas's acquaintance with classical authors, and Latin style. At last Professor Rand takes us into the "courtro to hear St. Thomas examining Cicero, one of his many witne Cicero's evidence is confined largely to questions on the virtues vices. Here Rand finds that Cicero is ". . . St. Thomas's con companion and one of his respected authorities . . . " (p. 32).

Now and then the author gets in a little beyond his safe dept discussing St. Thomas. Thus he attempts to defend St. Thomas the charge of excessive syllogizing (pp. 39-43) by showing ". . . his implement is not so much the syllogism as the distinction (p. 60). Again (on the basis of scattered texts containing cita of Cicero?) he finds that the flavor of the *Summa Theologic* philosophical rather than theological (p. 65).

The general mood of the lecture is playful. Naturally Professor I is at his best when his subject gives him an occasion to draw or rich fund of learning as a classical humanist and medievalist.

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